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Conservation in America is practiced largely by state and federal government This 
governmental strategy began in the Progressive Era o f the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As 
the 20th century progressed, local people and conservationists began experimenting with 
voluntary agreements such as hunting leases and conservation easements. This form of 
conservation, based on voluntary agreement, gives local people a way to bargain with public 
conservationists. My study proposes that local people always find a way to advance their 
interests by such bargaining. Furthermore, if bargaining is to lead to agreement, the bargainers 
must have a trusting relationship. I call this bargaining conservation strategy, Market 
Conservation. My study was made possible by the Boone and Crockett Club. As the Club's 
founders, especially Theodore Roosevelt, led the United States into the Progressive Era and the 
governmental model of conservation, so the current members have set out to lead the way toward 
a second model. The Boone and Crockett Wildlife Conservation Program at the University of 
Montana connects wildlife biology with other specialties to make interdisciplinary studies of 
conservation possible.
I used history, property-rights analysis, and ethnography to build a "thick description" of 
voluntary agreements in conservation. Thick description associates meanings, usually gathered 
| from personal interviews, with events. By taking three views — through history, property-rights
j analysis, and ethnography — I "triangulated" on the subject of interest according to guidelines
|  found in the literature on qualitative analysis.
I In arranging voluntary agreements, people try to: (1) protect immeasurable values by
|  protecting or managing surrogate values that are inexpensive to measure; (2) share the risk of
|  ecosystem dynamics that can destroy conservation values; and, (3) negotiate a balance between
|  local and national interests in land and wildlife. I defined 9 types of agreement
The combination of individual agreements and community-wide acceptance of 
conservation makes a local arrangement for conservation of endangered species. These local 
arrangements are struggling to form within constraints imposed by the formal arrangements 
codified in laws such as the Endangered Species A ct This presents the policy challenge of 
allowing local people to experiment with local arrangements while still protecting the national 
interest in endangered species conservation.
ii
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Preface
The professional audience addressed by most wildlife science dissertations is not expert 
on the topic of voluntary agreements because they are not the people "doing" them. Therefore, I 
have opted not to write in the usual style of a professional dissertation. This paper is not 
organized in sections of Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion, and neither is it sanitized 
of personal views and details. Yet I kept the purpose of writing a functional paper. The inclusive 
style and personality serve the purposes of (1) making these ideas accessible to the widest 
audience; and (2) including suppositions of what the data may mean, which is necessary in theory 
building.
There were many moments in this study of doubt and breakthrough. Einstein said the 
alternations of confidence and misgivings are known only to those who have experienced them. 
Only I know what it was like, but I could not have done it without help. In every step of progress 
I wondered how I jumped that last cold wall. Beveridge (1957), writing about the art of science,
I calls it magic. I attribute it to Hal Salwasser, Dan Pletscher, Mike Mattison, and Charlene
f Schildwachter — who pushed me when I got stuck to put my thoughts into words or pictures.
|  Other breakthroughs, though, seemed to come from nowhere. I think the prayers and good
\ intentions o f those who supported me in this project created a forward momentum that
I eventually overpowered the obstacles. I thank these supporters, knowing the only possible
I repayment is to pass on the same encouragement to others. I consider this a work in progress, the
I guts of a book, and though I did my best to polish it in the time allowed, I claim all its
I shortcomings.
; Other people made this work both possible and fun. I thank the members of the Boone
f and Crockett Club for their vision and commitment to conservation in funding and supporting
\
| the Wildlife Conservation Program. I thank my committee members for their contributions:
| Terry Anderson, for his enlightening skill of critical analysis and for funding my first paper on
[. voluntary agreements; Jon Driessen, for teaching me the skills of a naturalist that were left out of
£
my natural science curriculum; Jim Burchfield, for invigorating discussions about innovations 
! and the sociology of forestry; Bob Knight, for his sharp interest in getting things done, a constant
reminder that this project must be practical. Also, I thank Jim Riley of Intermountain Forest 
Industry Association for giving me time to finish this project as I began working for him.
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In the Summer of 1992,1 was half-way through a study of red-wolf reintroduction in 
eastern Tennessee, and I read a newspaper article entitled "Wolves in the Marketplace." The 
article described how Hank Fischer of Defenders of Wildlife was paying ranchers in Montana 
$5,000 when gray wolves denned successfully on their ranch. In Tennessee, I was thinking about 
how landowners surrounding Great Smoky Mountains National Park could be persuaded to 
tolerate the red w olves that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was releasing there and that would 
certainly range beyond the park's boundaries. At the same time, my advisor at the University of 
Tennessee, Mike Pelton, was helping a group of landowners, timber companies, public agencies, 
private conservation and environmental groups, and other scientists form the Black Bear 
Conservation Committee. This committee intended to restore the Louisiana black bear, which 
was likely to become an officially endangered species.
Sensing an explanation that ties together this group of happenings, I began studying 
these voluntary agreements. The Red Wolf Recovery Program was a new type of endangered 
species work done by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service: the Service accommodated concerns of 
local people about restrictions placed in their community to protect the red wolf. The Service was
1
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able to relax some restrictions through special rules that made the red wolves "nonessential" and 
"experimental." Defenders o f Wildlife also was accommodating local concerns about an 
endangered wolf, but in a different way. Defenders was in a market, but no one was claiming 
ownership of the wolves. The Black Bear Conservation Committee was addressing local concerns 
by visiting landowners and explaining their restoration plan. Some of those visits to landowners 
with concerns about bears ended up with the landowner donating money to the Committee.
Voluntary agreements are evidence of a departure in conservation from the dominant 
role of state and federal government agencies. The label, "Governmental Conservation" 
describes the publicly administered bureaucracy that governs most conservation work. "Market 
Conservation" describes the growing practice of conservation by local people bargaining and 
reaching agreement among themselves and with public agents about how projects will be done.
Purpose
My purpose is to describe the development of Market Conservation and suggest how
j conservationists and landowners can experiment with it by seeking voluntary agreements with
f each other. I do this by stating my hypothesis for why Defenders o f Wildlife is paying ranchers
t
I and why the Black Bear Conservation Committee wrote the recovery plan for a threatened
I species. This tentative explanation is, in short, that local people will always find a way to
I influence conservation decisions with their view of the costs and benefits of those decisions. The
s
I history of conservation shows how people asserted their interests and then how the building of
§ Governmental Conservation constrained local interests on behalf o f the national interest (Chapter
*»•
I 2). In the rest of the paper, I support my hypothesis with 48 case studies showing how
| conservationists and landowners have reached agreements. Chapter 3 reports the skills and steps
i
f they go through to reach agreement. Chapter 4 reports the economic details of their agreements.
! In Chapter 5 ,1 argue that conservation overall will improve if policy embraces my specific
j recommendations to create forums and favorable conditions for landowners and conservationists
i
; to reach voluntary agreements. Throughout the paper, I illustrate constraints on reaching
< agreement imposed by the current policies of Governmental Conservation.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Hypothesis and Implication
If local people are excluded from or relegated in conservation decisions, they will find a 
way to advance their interests by bargaining. Bargaining leads to agreement if the bargainers 
have a trusting relationship. The policies composing Governmental Conservation ignore values 
people have for natural resources (economic, social, and cultural) and usurp local rights (legal 
and de facto). People are finding ways to bargain for these values in whatever legal or de facto 
ways they can find or create. This bargaining is Market Conservation. When landowners and 
conservationists can develop trust and relationship, they reach agreement (see Chapter 3). Their 
agreement will match one of at least 9 types (see chapter 4). Whether the agreement manifests in 
a legal document -  a contract -  depends on transaction costs, culture, laws, and other constraints 
(see chapter 4).
When local interests are recognized and included and when the conservationists develop  
trust and relationship with local people, people are more comfortable with decisions. Whether 
Market Conservation produces acceptable progress in sustaining or restoring resources is yet to 
be seen. (I believe, by definition, a voluntary agreement produces acceptable results, but some
> people will accept nothing short of their own personal preference for the condition of resources.)
i
My hypothesis implies that the tension in conservation issues arises from local people 
struggling to find a place to represent their interest and non-local people concerned that their 
interests will be given away. We can probably ease this tension if we create a forum where 
people can negotiate local and national interests. Where an issue pertains mainly to private land, 
the best forum likely is the personal relationship between a field conservationist and a private 
landowner. Where the issue pertains mainly to a wildlife species or a tract of public land, the best 
forum likely is the relationship among members of a collaborative group. I will suggest ways 
both these fora can be created and encouraged.
(
j
| Methods
£
j
To develop my hypothesis and test it against instances of voluntary agreements, I took a 
naturalist's approach. I found and recorded factually and realistically the circumstances of 
agreement in everyday life. I did not try to isolate parts of everyday life, as a scientist 
instinctively would, because I wanted to draw practical observations that could be applied by 
practicing conservationists. To isolate an economic, social, or ecological part o f agreement would
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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have given conservationists some conclusion that was useful only in isolated cases. On the other 
hand, I used methods from each of these disciplines so I had a thorough view of everyday life 
(H g-1).
To combine economic, sociological, and ecological data in a study is called triangulation 
(Denzin 1970). The term was adapted metaphorically from navigation and surveying. Denzin's 
(1970:xii) definition is "the combination of measurement strategies ... for resolving the inherent 
biases o f one measurement technique" or, simply, the use o f "multiple methods of observation" 
(Denzin 1970:26). I felt it is important to know what voluntary agreements look like 
economically, but having a contract in hand leaves the conservationist to figure out how  to 
contact a landowner, and overcome the suspicion that the landowner probably has, and get on 
track to negotiating an agreement Likewise, knowing the sociological part of the problem leaves 
out the contract. "Sociological reality is such that no single method, theory, or observer can ever 
capture all that is relevant and important" (Denzin 1970:xii).
Very little systematically collected ecological data are available to describe the ecological 
results of voluntary agreements. I gathered historical information from secondary sources and  
analyzed them using "A Guide for Critical Thinking about Natural Resource Case Studies"
t (Salwasser 1994). The economic and sociological data I collected were interviews and documents.
f
j- Contracts, brochures, and other documents allowed m e to describe the economic elem ents o f
t
| agreements through property-rights analysis. Interviews provided the stories that allow ed me to
|  describe the meanings behind these artifacts as expressed by the people who use them. I
I analyzed the stories with ethnographic methods. I describe these methods in detail as they com e
I up in the following chapters.
r:1,
I Justifying A Naturalist's Approach
*'■
|  I used no statistical inference, but relied on observation and induction, which draws on£
the roots of w ildlife science. Darwin, for example, observed and induced.
! Naturalistic approaches may lead to discovery of statistically valid associations, but until
we have a preliminary theory about the phenomenon, statistical hypothesis-testing is premature. 
Nevertheless, my naturalistic approach may appear unscientific to some; therefore, here is a 
justification.
Science is an attempt to make statements about the world that anyone can replicate, 
whereas art is a deliberate attempt to state something from a personal perspective (O'Hear 1995). 
My view  of history', and what I hear in an interview, and how I classify agreements is not
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Focus of study
ECONOMICS S 'SOCIOLOGY
Fig. 1. Schematic map of intellectual disciplines and interdisciplinary 
thought pertinent to improving endangered species recovery.
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replicable, but neither is it deliberately personal. It is in between, and that is the realm of the 
naturalist.
Naturalistic science — relying on observation, induction, invention, and intuition — is the 
first and most basic scientific discipline. Biologists, acting as naturalists, relied on induction in 
the middle decades of this century as they developed criteria for sex and age of wildlife 
(Dimmick and Pelton 1994). For example, one of the most common skills of biologists, estimating 
the age of white-tailed deer, is based on the examination of numerous jawbones (Severinghaus 
1949). These techniques are no longer the most accurate, but they were the mainstay of research 
and management until replaced by new techniques.
The most influential theory in the natural sciences was also induced from an observed 
database. Charles Darwin "returned after a voyage of five years with a firsthand knowledge of 
geology and zoology ... and ... the germinal ideas of his theory of evolution" (Eliot 1909:5).
Darwin himself described his work as the success of "unbounded patience in long reflecting over 
my subject — industry in observing and collecting facts -  and a fair share of invention as well as 
of common sense" (Eliot 1909:8). Naturalistic science is also found in physics. Einstein said, 
"There is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the w ay of
j intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance" (Einstein 1933).
s
f The need for induction, invention, and intuition in science is not, however, a license for
\ creative writing. Darwin and the others saw the need to present for review the data from which
i
j they built their theories. "No one can feel more sensible than I do of the necessity of hereafter
i publishing in detail all the facts, with references, on which my conclusions have been grounded"
|  (Darwin 1859:22). The value in having others review the data of a naturalistic study is to sharpen
( the researcher's eye for "the order lying behind the appearance."
i
I A Search, Not a Sample
j Using a technique called snowball sampling (Strauss and Corbin 1990), I moved
| deliberately from one story about an agreement to another, usually asking people involved to
| help me find another case of agreement. I searched; I did not sample. The result is 48 cases of
agreement representing numerous documents and 27 interviews. Later in the paper, I call the 
interviewees "members" because they all belong to the population of people who know how to 
reach agreement about conservation on private land. This group of people does not represent a 
sample of the views about reaching agreement in the statistical sense. Statistically speaking, a
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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sample is a subset of a population drawn randomly or by some design to represent the 
population.
Capsule of Findings
Governmental Conservation: Analysis, Planning, and Centralized Power
During the frontier era in American history, resources were open to taking by anyone and 
the resources dwindled: a scenario known as the "tragedy o f the commons" (Hardin 1968).
People responded by limiting access to the commons. Authority for limiting access was vested in 
state and national government. Under this regime, bureaucrats allocated resources by believing 
in "the gospel of efficiency" (Hays 1959) and responding to special interests. Efficiency prompted 
rational-comprehensive planning schemes. Influence worked by relationships among the 
bureaucrats, Congressional staffs, and interest groups that resulted in "contracts" allocating 
values. Relationships leading to "contracts" also were shared by local agents of Governmental 
Conservation, such as forest rangers, game wardens, and local citizens. However, as resources
I became scarcer, more and broader interests demanded a share of the values. Ultimately this led
l
1 to laws and regulations that constrained local (native) officials and forced more reliance of
|  scientific rules of Governmental Conservation.
I Under the central organization of Governmental Conservation, bureaucrats attempt to
j: enlarge the budget of their programs and retain authority in allocating that budget (Cubbage et
I al. 1993). Decentralizing power, by enabling more local decisions, is painful for the power-
jj brokers in public office and interest groups. All experience says that decentralized organizations
work better, but political appointees continue to act to centralize power.
r-
[ In Conservation, People Negotiate Local and National Interests
; Whereas the public lands and wildlife are held in trust by state and federal government
| on behalf of the entire nation, these resources are particularly interesting to the local people who
i live in their midst and rely on some of these for their economic well-being. Recognizing the local
?
■ interest in public resources, Gifford Pinchot directed forest rangers to become part of their
communities. Later, the Forest Service and other agencies became concerned that local agents 
who have "gone native" were cutting deals against the national interest. Agencies then began 
moving agents more frequently, prohibiting them from going native. Also, laws were passed that 
established cumbersome processes for publicizing and gathering comments on the activities of
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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public agencies. The National Environmental Policy Act is the primary o f such laws. The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act is another such law. Because people can file lawsuits challenging 
agencies' adherence to the processes required by these laws, agency conservationists can be 
inhibited in dealing with local people (see pp. 37).
People reaching voluntary agreements today try to balance the local and national 
interests w ithin rules established to protect the national interest This finding is introduced in 
Chapter 2  and discussed in Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5.
Local Conservationists Rely on Trust and Relationship
Voluntary agreements today result from relationships among public agents, local 
conservationists, and landowners. Conservationists have learned to build relationships and 
establish trust in communities so that agreement is possible. Moving from these relationships 
into circumstances in that community, and then to specific terms of an agreement requires a 
knowledge of the interests and concerns of landowners. I report these stages in Chapter 3.
Agreements use the same science employed by Governmental Conservation, but local 
people apply this knowledge secondarily to building the relationships that base their bargaining.
I Once the bargaining relationship is underway, people apply the facts and findings of science to
A
\ the agreement they are trying to reach. There are face-to-face encounters here that
: conservationists and landowners need to Ieam to do.
Market Conservation Results in at Least 9 Types of Agreement
Agreements that are reached take 9 main forms. The types are: (1) Registry; (2) Reward 
and Compensation; (3) Lease; (4) Cost-share; (5) Easement; (6) Franchise; (7) Private 
Management; (8) Exemptions; and, (9) Working Together and Miscellany. These types can be 
modified or used to define new types. These details are presented in Chapter 4.
j Costs Constrain Voluntary Agreements
[ Assum ing conservationists and landowners establish sufficient trust and relationship,
; and assum ing they overcome the constraints in place to protect the national interest, they must
face the costs of reaching agreement and carrying out conservation practices. These costs arise 
from: (1) finding trading partners, (2) defining and measuring rights of trade, and (3) ecosystem  
dynamics that destroy conservation values.
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Voluntary Agreements Need a Forum
N ow  w e have returned to a setting where public agents are faced with bargaining but 
now they are constrained by the rules o f Governmental Conservation that developed since 
Gifford Pinchot urged his forest rangers to "go native." Local conservationists and landowners 
are struggling to reach agreement within constraints imposed by the formal arrangements 
codified in laws such as the Endangered Species A ct This presents the policy challenge of 
allow ing local people to experiment with local arrangements while still protecting the national 
interest in endangered species. This finding is reached in Chapter 5.
Conclusion
Market Conservation will develop further as local people are enabled to reach durable 
agreements and if these agreements lead to protected and improved wildlife habitats and 
populations. To enable local people and conservationists, we must temper legal constraints such 
as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the threat of 
litigation. Supervisors of local conservationists need to stop evaluating job performance solely in 
terms o f acres treated or ecological conditions improved, and begin measuring the ability of local 
conservationists to become trusted members of their communities. This entails allowing time to 
local conservationists to be available in communities for chance encounters, to join community 
events, and to work with local people on small projects. In some cases, local cultures will need to 
change: receiving payments to protect gray wolves on private property will need to become 
acceptable just as charging hunters for access has had to.
My recommendations (Chapter 5, draft pp. 77-79) will help conservationists and 
landowners experiment with Market Conservation. The value of their agreements to the 
conservation movement will be seen in retrospect, when land, water, fish, and wildlife have had 
time to respond to conservation work done by voluntary agreement.
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|  In Fall 1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service dispatched federal game wardens to their
|  Austin, Texas, office to investigate a large number of reports that landowners were illegally
4
|  clearing land that was habitat for golden-cheeked warblers (Dendroica chrysoparia) and black-
1
i capped vireos (Vireo atricapilla) (Bantz 1993). In another place and time, about a century earlier,
in 1886, a troop of the First Cavalry arrived at the 14-year-old Yellowstone Park to begin 
"roaming the back trails and canyons, flushing out hunters, woodcutters, and souvenir collectors" 
(Trefethen 1975:79). Like any armed police action, these were tense for the people involved.
Wyoming in 1886 and Texas in 1993 are cases of growing pains in American 
conservation: tense moments that marked the birth of new conservation strategies. The strategy 
developed after the Yellowstone incident is Governmental Conservation, which is the system of 
federal and state agencies, public lands, and the laws and regulations by which they are 
managed. This, along with the non-govemmental organizations, is conservation as w e know it in 
America. Tension over endangered species issues such as the example from Texas marks the
10
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forming of a new strategy, Market Conservation. This approach depends on local people 
reaching agreements to protect and restore endangered species and other natural resources.
The fundamental chronology of American conservation shows that local people find 
ways to influence conservation with their view  o f costs and benefits (Fig. 2). Economic concepts 
such as property rights and social cost played a role. Political leadership of Progressive
politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt also influenced this history. Evolving scientific ideas 
helped m ove conservationists from protecting to producing wildlife, and changed our view  of 
nature as a machine to nature as a living being, adapting to conditions. These and other factors 
have brought landowners and conservationists into personal relationships where they reconcile 
their rival interests in resources. The following chapters describe these relationships that relieve 
the tensions.
Competition for the Commons: 1600s -  1930s
The decision to hold wildlife as common property is a defining feature of American 
conservation history from European immigration in the 1600s to the 1930s. This decision brought 
the risk of a "tragedy of the commons" and set up a rivalry between the interests in wildlife held 
|  by all Americans everywhere and the interests o f local Americans living in the midst of the
| w ildlife and other resources.
|  Free from royalty that had excluded them from wildlife in Europe, and in the midst of an
I abundance of wildlife such as they had never seen, European immigrants to North America
|  hunted and fished freely to sustain themselves. Wildlife began to decline fairly quickly: local
|  ordinances limiting the killing of deer began in the 1600s (Leopold 1933). This scenario fits what
|  Hardin (1968) called the "tragedy of the commons" and shows how that tragedy is prevented or
! averted.
B
• The "tragedy of the commons" is that people will not maintain or enhance a resource that
f is open for all to use; the solution is "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).
| W ildlife, by definition, is free to roam; therefore, no one can control access to it. Every person
I living in the midst of the wildlife can try to capture some of it. N o one invests in maintaining the
1
‘ w ildlife because their investment would be lost to whoever reaps the benefit before they do.
Hardin (1968) extrapolates this scenario to its tragic end: a resource useful to everyone is 
exhausted because everyone uses it but no one maintains it. The only way out is for the users to 
agree among themselves to limit their use. They coerce each other by mutual agreement.
Game ordinances in the 1600s were the first step of mutual coercion agreed to by the new  
Americans. After restrictive ordinances came governmental agencies. People realized that
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Fig. 2. Fundamental Chronology Leading to Voluntary Agreements
1600s
1970s
Local people compete for wildlife; "tragedy of the 
commons" looms; property rigjhts for wildlife are not 
established
U.S. creates federal agencies to protect the national 
public interest in wildlife.
• National interest formalized as "Governmental 
Conservation" run by a central bureaucracy of
techrrically-trainedresource specialists and funded 
by taxes.
• Relationships with local people are discouraged
• Nature Conservancy begins deeding in real 
estate market for conservation purposes.
■ Economists rethink social cost and tragedy of 
the commons.
• Market Conservation begins developing.
Endangered Species Act passes. 
Limits of Governmental Conservation 
when local interests are excluded
Endangered Species Act 
amended to include some local 
interests.
Voluntary agreements become 
popular, Market Conservation 
enters formative stage.
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limiting access to wildlife, especially wild fisheries, was hard to administer. It was hard to ensure 
equitable opportunities because fish-harvesters could strategically place nets and effectively 
eliminate another person's chance to catch fish. Also, some state governments shared access to 
rivers and other bodies of water which raised the question of who held superior authority. These 
problems motivated the establishment of the first federal agency in fish or wildlife management: 
the U.S. Fish Commission established in 1871.
Forming federal commissions did not solve all problems with managing wildlife, but it 
founded the governmental strategy and established a national interest in wildlife and natural 
resources. National interest is the right, claim, or legal share to wildlife and natural resources 
that American citizens hold, and that the governmental agencies represent. Individual citizens, 
or communities, have been required since the beginning of Governmental Conservation to clear 
their use of wildlife and natural resources with all other Americans.
Although the common-property nature of wildlife was the driving force toward 
Governmental Conservation, other factors played a role and helped define how  Governmental 
Conservation works. During the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), interpretations of 
the Constitution by the Supreme Court began setting legal precedent for government to interfere 
' with individual action (Anderson and Hill 1980). A political ideology known as Progressivism
t  developed and -  among its other objectives of trust-busting and dethroning "robber barons" -ic.
H pushed a "gospel of efficiency" in land management (Hays 1959). Efficiency was the goal of
|  calculations that divided land-management values equitably by professionally trained specialists
I in the Executive bureaucracy. The Progressives changed the Executive branch from a passive
I affirmer of policies made by Congress into a technically skilled developer of policy. Efficiency
E was possible, in part, because interests in land were divisible: amounts of land, water, timber,
t;
P and other commodities could be divided and distributed.
|  Private ownership of wildlife and resources -  the alternative to public ownership -  was
k'
considered, but the only property right imaginable at the time was in physical control of land and 
I wildlife (Tober 1981). In addition, the costs of establishing ownership to the amenity values of
r
, land and wildlife were prohibitive. In short, neither the political nor economic conditions for the
\ evolution of property rights over wildlife were in place.
; The scientific understanding of wildlife management is the closing point on this first
phase of history. Leopold (1933) wrote the first text on the subject. H e reported that concepts of 
game management evolved in history from protection of stocks to managing the ecological factors 
on which those stocks depend. His definition of game management marked the transition in
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America from a mostly protective strategy to one that would "produce annual crops." In the next 
phase of history, American conservationists worked to do just that.
Governmental Conservation: 1930s -  1970s
In the 1930s, the final pieces of Governmental Conservation were placed.
Combined with Congressional "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States" (U.S. 
Constitution IV §3), .the Progressives had institutionalized a system of public land overseen by an 
executive bureaucracy. America's investment in education through land-grant universities was 
producing professionally-trained resource managers. These managers were organizing 
themselves into professional societies like The Wildlife Society, founded in 1937. Taxes were the 
main means of funding conservation. The Migratory Bird Stamp Act (1934) and the Federal Aid 
in Wildlife Restoration Acts (1937 and 1950) created a financial base for much of the game 
management for waterfowl and restoration of white-tailed deer (Odocoileiis virginianus) and other 
game species.
j Interest groups had been forming since 1875 (American Forestry Association), and
|  continued to organize as the first conservation model formed. "Power clusters" (Behan 1977) or
"iron triangles" (Cubbage et al. 1993) developed as these groups built relationships with members 
of Congressional and agency staffs. These clusters created a powerful role for small groups or 
minorities. Especially in technical issues, agency specialists, lobbyists, and Congressional staff 
together become the experts, thus limiting substantive debate to a small group. Hays (1959) 
described the Progressive leaders of conservation as such a minority. The political battles among 
i the minorities lobbying for their interests began as early as 1924, when the magazine Outlook
criticized the U.S. Forest Service for over-emphasizing recreation over forestry (Carhart 1962).
t:
£ Governmental Conservation was also marked by policies that prevented local agents
j from "going native." As representatives of the public interest in valuable natural resources, and
I also as residents in local communities, these agents walked the line where local and national
interests meet. To som e extent, federal agencies moved their local representatives frequently to 
prevent them from becoming too sympathetic to local interests and therefore too lenient in 
controlling the use of public resources. Kaufman (1960:218) put it this way:
The practice of transferring men rapidly, particularly in the early stages 
of their careers, also counterbalances the danger of their being 'captured' by the 
communities in which they live and work. To be sure, the Forest Service 
encourages its men to recognize and understand the concerns of their 
communities, and to take part in community affairs. But there have been
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instances in which the utility of a good forest officer has been gravely reduced 
because he became so enmeshed in local affiars that he could not properly 
discharge his reponsibilities as a representative of the agency and the agency's 
view of the public interest
Peterson and Speth (1982:13) describe in detail the problem early forest rangers had in 
being "a promoter and educator [of conservation] and ... a policeman." This "created tension and 
confusion," Peterson and Speth (1982:13) go on to say, and represents a battle as old as the 
colonial struggle for self rule and as new as the Sagebrush Rebellion. Part of the difficulty was in 
the inability of anyone to divide the uses of public land in any way other than through a public 
decision-maker such as a ranger. Events of mid-century, however, began to remove that barrier 
as The Nature Conservancy formed and Ronald Coase began devising new ways to apply market 
principles.
The Beginnings of Market Conservation: 1950s -  1960s
The birth o f Market Conservation as an alternative to Government Conservation began in 
the practical work of The Nature Conservancy and the theoretical work of Coase (1960). Ronald
* Coase is an econom ist who won the Nobel Prize in 1991. The Nature Conservancy was formed in
f
\ 1951 by ecologists who wanted to apply their skills on private land (TNC1997). The Conservancy
Vr
£ began dealing in real estate to protect conservation values o f private land. By doing this they
|  demonstrated a principle that Coase later described. To m y knowledge, there was no connection
rw
I  between Coase and the Conservancy.
|  Coase (1960) argued that the costs of pollution (the classic "externality") could be covered
k
f by defining new property rights based on the actual costs perceived by people involved in the
i
r pollution. That new  right could be the sufferer's right to clean air, or the polluter's right to
r
|  dispose of waste. The polluter and the sufferer could strike a deal either by having the polluter
\ pay the sufferers for the right to pollute, or the sufferers could pay for the right to clear air.
1 By 1951, when the Conservancy began its work. Governmental Conservation was
operating clearly and somewhat effectively, creating a "clear tendency in American conservation 
to relegate to government all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform" (Leopold 
1949:213).
Government ownership, operation, subsidy, or regulation is now  widely  
prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed management, park 
and wilderness conservation, fisheries management, and migratory bird 
management. Most of this growth in governmental conservation is proper and 
logical, som e of it is inevitable (Leopold 1949:213).
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The assumption in most people's mind had to be that if private lands harbored some rare or 
beautiful feature, then a governmental program would be the way to protect it. That was not the 
assumption of the Conservancy’s founders.
The Conservancy demonstrated Coase's principle o f reciprocity by raising private funds to 
buy private property to protect ecological features of land in the public interest. Analogously to 
Coase (1960) and the example of a polluter, a private landowner who intends to destroy a rare or 
beautiful feature of his or her land is the polluter. Losing that feature would be a cost to society 
as is tolerating pollution. Government could stop the landowner, thereby imposing a cost on the 
landowner. On the other hand, the Conservancy decided to impose the cost on society by raising 
private funds to pay the landowner or buy the land.
The economic picture today is much different. Land values have risen so high that 
Roosevelt's inheritance tax has become, ironically, a threat to conservation (Small 1992). Because 
the tax has become expensive to people of common means, families must often sell lands for their 
highest market value (small parcels for real-estate development) in order to pay the tax. Also, 
people have made land ownership complex by defining multiple property rights for a single tract 
of land: public lands are leased for specific uses, private lands are "encumbered" with easements 
that transfer limited property interests to conservation groups. Lueck (1995) showed that various 
rights to land can be held by several parties, and also that landowners with enough land to 
encompass the range o f a population can, by controlling access, achieve de facto ownership of that 
population.
Endangered Species Act and Limits of Governmental
I Conservation: 1970s -  present
!
) The Endangered Species Act laid out a process by which specialists would analyze the
S f
£ likelihood that a species could persist and carry out a plan to raise that likelihood. No one
v
[ anticipated the costs.
? After the Endangered Species Act became law in 1973, its supporters were surprised by
i
= the lack of rapid listings and delineations of critical habitat Twenty years after passage, the
process still is slow  and questionable in effectiveness. Yaffee (1982) concluded that during the 5
years between passage and the first amendments to the A ct in 1978, most proposals for listing 
particular species languished in the review process. Similarly, he observed that critical habitats 
were designated only under pressure of litigation. More recently, Tear et al. (1993) argued that
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7
recovery targets are often below scientific opinion of what levels would maximize the chance of 
saving the species. The problems with the listing process, according to a Fish and Wildlife 
Service assistant regional director quoted by Cohn (1990:22), boil down to, "In a nutshell we're too 
busy with other species... We don't have the money or resources to list every species that 
deserves it."
Statistics summarize the situation: 3,600 species proposed for listing; about 780 listed;
367 recovery plans approved; and only 18 species removed from the list (6 recovered, 6 
disqualified, 6 extinct) (Shank, USFWS, pers. comm. 1993).
The explanation lies in two faulty assumptions: (1) technical definitions exist for central 
components of the policy such as endangered status and critical habitat, and; (2) a polity such as 
this, which prohibits certain actions, eliminates discretion among decision-makers in the 
implementing agency (Yaffee 1982). In practice, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National 
Marine Fisheries Service found room enough within the Act to establish an unstated policy 
composed of 2 themes: delay decisions in the face of controversy, and act conservatively (i.e., 
minimize the number of species listed and area of critical habitat designated).
There are costs to bureaucratic foot-dragging. Obviously, those favoring the policy were 
dissatisfied for lack of progress. Those opposed and indifferent both paid in terms of stress and 
financial losses generated by the uncertainty and delay. Other federal agencies, such as the Corps 
of Engineers were required to wait on decisions from the Fish and Wildlife Service and National 
Marine Fisheries Service to complete consultations on projects. Private individuals waiting for 
permits from the Corps of Engineers were, in turn, delayed, which cost some of them in interest 
payments, idled equipment, and other expenses incurred by delayed projects.
On the macroeconomic scale, the near scuttling of the Tellico Dam project resulted in the 
clear statement of the Supreme Court that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute 
was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost" (T.V.A. v. H ill).
On the microeconomic scale, individual landowners have lost values from their land when  
regulations under the Endangered Species Act precluded them from building on or otherwise 
developing all or part of their property: Fitzgerald (1993) describes several cases of this, 
including the Off family in the San Joaquin Valley, CA, and the Morian family of Austin, TX.
Many of these "horror stories" have intricate details that authors seem to shuffle according to their 
own political views, but the case law behind the problem of regulating private land is clearing up. 
"If a regulation destroys the opportunity to use one or more of the sticks [representing one or 
more rights to land], but the remaining sticks give value to the bundle [of sticks] as a whole, no 
taking has occurred" (Duerksen and Roddewig 1994:17-18).
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ESA Amendments of 1982 Open the Door for Local Interests: 
1980s -  present
Responding to the costs inadvertently imposed on local people. Congress amended the 
Act in 1982 to allow otherwise legal activities to proceed, under certain conditions, even if these 
activities harmed an endangered species. For example, in reintroducing the red w olf to coastal 
North Carolina, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service allowed local hunters and trappers the right to 
accidentally kill or trap a red wolf. Hunters and trappers would be forgiven their error if they 
reported the incident within 24 hours and if investigators agreed it was an accident.
Also responding to costs imposed on local people, but not waiting for an act of Congress, 
Defenders of Wildlife -  a non-profit environmental organization -  raised money with which to 
reimburse ranchers for the cost of livestock killed by gray wolves in Montana and Idaho. Upon 
determination by a wildlife biologist that dead stock was killed by wolves. Defenders would pay 
the rancher.
[ Defenders was practicing "free-market environmentalism" (Anderson and Leal 1991). The
; concept is to establish property rights for features of the environment and then bargain for them.
« For example, the value o f gray wolves held by environmentalists was meaningless to landowners
|  because there was no w ay for the landowner to profit by having wolves around. Defenders found
1 a way to frame a transaction around the fact that the landowner is tolerating, if not supporting, wolves. Through the Defenders program people who value wolves can give landowners an f incentive to maintain or enhance the suitability of his or her land for wolves.
* Market Conservation comprises more than the "free-market environmentalism" of
|  Anderson and Leal (1991). Free-market environmentalism is based on a world view  of people|
|  tending toward self-interest, where pertinent knowledge about resources cannot be captured by
| the people in a single government agency or a single company (Anderson and Leal 1991). A
f
£ related, but larger, concept is "market liberalism," which has been defined as "forward-
f
• looking-.comfortable with a changing world, tolerant, and enthusiastic about market process and
i individual liberty" (Boaz and Crane 1993:9). Market liberalism adds to free-market
environmentalism the social dimension of a cosmopolitan, inclusive society. This describes the 
attitude of local conservationists and landowners today who are learning to enjoy their 
differences. Putting these ideas together, I call today's voluntary agreements, Market 
Conservation. I prefer "conservation" to "environmentalism" -  although these words can be
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used synonym ously for political reasons -  because conservation implies to me judicious use of 
resources and environmentalism implies protectionism.
Citizen Management: 1990s -  present
As of this writing, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposes to authorize a group of 
citizens and agency officials to reintroduce grizzly bears in northern Idaho (USFWS1997). This 
plan admits local interests to conservation like no other of which I am aware.
Depending on the outcome of the proposal, the Citizen Management Committee could 
become a model for Market Conservation. To restore the bear, the citizen management 
committee must negotiate the value of bear habitat and rival uses people have for that sam e land. 
For example, if citizens allow forest products companies to harvest so many trees from the forest 
that bears can be seen from long distances, then the risk of bears being shot rises. The 
relationship between tree-density and shooting-risk has not yet been estimated, much less 
determined with accuracy. Other values at stake are even harder to describe; for example, how 
does the recreational value of the forest change when there is a risk of a grizzly bear nosing into a 
|  tent? These values obviously differ among local people who will live in the midst of the bears,
|  and other Americans who will enjoy simply knowing that bears are back in Idaho. Through a
1 citizen management committee, local people will have a direct and mandated authority to asserttheir values in the decision within the constraints of the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other applicable laws.
i
I Conclusion
II
I This brief and superficial history of forces driving conservation has brought us to a place
I of figuring out how  to arrange conservation voluntarily. This is the setting for the news of
‘t*
f  peaceful solutions to conflicts over endangered species conservation. In Louisiana, a group of
t landowners, agencies, conservation groups, and academics decided to work together as the Black
5 Bear Conservation Committee and wrote a recovery plan that was adopted by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service for the threatened Louisiana black bear (Ursiis americanus luteolus). In the 
Sandhills of North Carolina, a working group of public agencies, conservation interests, 
community groups, and private landowners developed Safe Harbor, a concept that limits a 
landowner’s legal obligation so they feel free to improve the status of red-cockaded woodpeckers 
(Picoides borealis) on their land. In Montana, as I mentioned at the start of Chapter 1, Defenders of
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Wildlife is delivering rewards of S5,000 to landowners on whose property endangered gray 
wolves den.
The growing number of cooperative solutions with landowners is an encouragement and 
a challenge. It encourages us to believe that people are capable of productive negotiation and 
challenges us to understand how it is done so we can do it more often and more effectively. 
Concepts of negotiated conservation, or Market Conservation, are only beginning to appear in the 
writings of wildlife and forestry professionals. Wildlife professionals seem limited to the neo­
classical economic paradigm (Geist and McTaggart-Cowan 1995, Schildwachter 1996a), but 
foresters seem farther along in recognizing ideas such as free-market environmentalism (Cubbage 
et al. 1993). Neither foresters nor wildlife professionals have any guidance w idely available on 
using voluntary agreements. This is evident in the writings of those who lament the fact (Maehr 
1990) and those who ignore the problems it raises (O'Connell and Noss 1992). In the next 
chapters, I explain what case studies can teach us about how to reach agreements in conservation.
i
£
i
|
i
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£
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To begin this chapter, I will get straight to the main point; to reach agreement, 
conservationists and landowners must accommodate each other's interests, and doing this 
requires that they have trusting relationships. After two sections illustrating these conclusions, I 
explain how I arrived at them.
Reaching Agreement Means Accommodating Others’ Interests
To understand what was happening in cases such as the Black Bear Conservation 
Committee and Defenders of Wildlife, I began talking to the people involved. Mostly, they talked 
about interests: their rights, claims, and desires, and those of their counterparts. In reaching 
agreement, they were accommodating each others' interests.
RF: "We need a forest out there that can do what everybody needs it to do."
GS: "The Forest Service was interested in doing their thing on National Forest lands."
JS: "Oh, I've got to go along with it, I may not like it, but I'll put m y twist into it wherever I
can put m y twist into it"
GW: "The difference is being willing to compromise, using common sense and reason."
GW: "The agenda in my mind is what I said before, when people come in set in their ways and
are uncompromising. I question the motivation of the people who filed the petition [to 
list the Atlantic salmon as endangered]. I remember something in the paper that if the 
Bangor hydro would throw out their permit to build the Basins Mill dam, they would 
throw out their petition to have this fish listed, which tells me that they've got an 
agenda."
GW: "Even when their whole life is around the salmon and saving the salmon, and I
understand that, that's what they're paid to do, that’s what they're trained to do, and 
that’s what they supposed to do. And they need to understand that I am paid and 
trained to grow blueberries and make a profit and thats where we have to understand 
that and cooperate."
JS: "What's their job? Their job is to improve that earth, make it the best obviously and in the
back of everybody minds: recreation. They've got to raise the elk, that's what creates the
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dollars. We just see a little different on wildlife issues. That's his business, his area."
GS: "We were trying to get guys ((private landowners)) to plant something other than crested
wheatgrass."
RF: "Where our forests were growing to supply our mills ... w e got so restricted so narrowed
in. You know, an eagle's nest, and we can't go within a half mile, we believe in that, w e’d 
do that, but just the same, all these things are just nipping away and eventually it limits 
your ability to do business."
To Reach Agreement Requires Trusting Relationships
Throughout this chapter, the words of people I interviewed make clear that trust and
relationship are necessary for agreement.
Personal Relationships
JM: "The reason it got started over there is that a lot of people in the wildlife management
districts were already working with farmers. A lot o f our easements over there that w e  
currently have were started by Partners for Wildlife Projects developing credibility and 
trust with the landowners."
GN: "These relationships, you know, sometimes you get so focused in on doing a project that,
you know, I don't have time to talk to the fisheries guys, I don't have time to deed with 
that group over here, I just want to go out and do this project Up front it takes a long 
time to establish those relationships with the fisheries guys and all those other agencies 
and groups and whatnot. It takes a long time to get that up front but once you establish 
that relationship, you feel comfortable with him, we're at the point now where, shoot, it's 
no big deal, I mean we get permission from a fisheries biologist over the phone to do, you 
know, they feel trust, they have a lot of trust and creditability with us and they say, ’Oh, 
yeah, you know what you're doing, go ahead and do it.' But up front it took us years to 
get where we're at, but now that we're there, we've put a lot of time in but, shoot, now it's 
a piece of cake. You know all the players."
JS: "if there's a problem -  agriculture vs. U.S. Fish & Wildlife -  bring those two groups
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together, [and] talk about it. People are actually big enough to sit there and tell you to 
your face instead of the usual confrontation stuff."
Community Relationships
The "grapevine" is another example of local relationships working to help or hinder 
agreement
When conservationists are well-received and lay to rest people's concerns, then:
GS: "...then you can start seeing how things, how  the grapevine, really starts to work. And
things just take off at that point"
When conservationists do not built trust, then:
GS: "As soon as w e had that first meeting, that's when the rumor mill started about, 'Boy
there's this big movement and these guys are cooking a conservation strategy up to move 
the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area up to Highway 89.' And that's how that whole rumor, 
the grapevine, the phones started ringing and then, then w e were on the defense from 
there on."
f
: How I Reached These Conclusions
|  I focused this study on face-to-face encounters between conservationists and landowners,
f This required qualitative research methods, which I describe in the following sub-section,
I Studying the Bargain. In the next sub-section, Creating an Incentive, I explain how this
? approach shows that incentives are created by agreements.
k
I Studying the Bargain
F .
I Accepting the importance of understanding face-to-face encounters between
t
; conservationists and local people still leaves the problem of knowing how to study those
t
j encounters. This section explains how I studied those encounters.
1
Gathering Data
I reviewed 48 cases of voluntary agreements between landowners and conservationists 
(Table 1). For each case I had at least an anecdote describing what happened (n=14), and for 
others I had written or photographic material (n=15), and for some I also collected interviews 
(n=19). Because I collected multiple interviews per case, the total number of interviews is n=26. I
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looked for differences among the ideas of people within each case and also between cases. For 
example, the Blackfoot Challenge case and ProjectSHARE both involve groups in which pairs of 
people reach agreements of their own. The Blackfoot Challenge interviews emphasize one-on- 
one agreements and Project SHARE emphasizes group work. The landowners interviewed for 
this report are ranchers, small agricultural business managers, large industrial-lands managers, 
and small owners with employment off the property.
Table 1. List of cases studied. (A.) Types of information. (B.) Names and 
anecdotes of cases.
A. Type of information gathered_______ Number of C ases
Interviews, Materials, Anecdote 19
(note: total number of interviews, n=26)
Materials, Anecdote 15
Anecdote 14
Total 48
B. Names and anecdotes of cases
CASE NAME______________________________________________ INFORMATION GATHERED
A CE B asin  Anecdote Material
A cooperative group that restored an estuary where the Ashepoo, Combahee, and Edisto Rivers converge in 
South Carolina.
A p p leg a te  P a rtn e rsh ip  Anecdote Material
The AP is a community-based project in southwestern Oregon involving industry, conservation groups, natural 
resource agencies, and residents cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural resources by 
principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity. Through community involvement and education, this 
partnership supports management of all land within the watershed in a manner that sustains natural resources, 
and that will in turn, contribute to economic and community stability within the Applegate valley.
B lack B e a r  C o n se rv a tio n  C om m ittee Anecdote Material Interviews
A group of private, state, and federal wildlife professionals, timber company personnel, farmers, and 
environmentalists that has organized to study and manage the Louisiana black bear.
• B lackfoot C h a lle n g e  Anecdote Material Interviews
£ A cooperative group formed in the Blackfoot Valley in western MT to coordinate efforts of conservationists and
[ reach voluntary agreements with landowners. Since formation, they have accepted an invitation to become a
working group for the Montana Bull Trout Restoration Team.
Bull T rou t R esto ra tio n  T eam  Anecdote Material Interviews
Montana Governor Marc Racicot held a roundtable, which produced a task force, that was charged with 
planning and implementing the restoration of bull trout in Montana.
California C o a s ta l H abitats (NCCP) Anecdote Material
T he National Fish and Wildlife Foundation funded the state agency to establish innovative plan to protect 
critical California coastal sage habitat and species that depend on it. The parties are trying to form a preserve 
system .
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C am ero n  C ounty  Ag-Wildlife C oex istence  C om m ittee  Anecdote Material Interviews
A group diverse interests in Cameron Co.. Texas, that organized to coordinate pesticide u se  with reintroduction 
of Aplomado falcon (Falco femoralis).
C hickasaw -S h iloh  R e so u rc e  C onservation  an d  D evelopm en t C ouncil, Inc. Anecdote
A group in western Tennessee trying to implement ‘best m anagem ent practices’ on cropland in the Bear Creek 
w atershed to reduce annual sediment load by 50% by providing technical assistance and educational outreach 
to farmers.
C o lo rado  D ivision o f Wildlife Anecdote Material
The Division acts a s  a franchiser by requiring financial compensation and specified performance from a 
landowner, the franchisee, in exchange for the right to sell big-game hunting permits (see p. 69).
C raw ford an d  B ourland  C onsulting F o re s te rs  Anecdote Material Interviews
These consultants arrange fee-access programs for private landowners in the southeastern U.S. (see p. 63)
D efen d ers  o f W ildlife Anecdote Material Interviews
In the Rocky Mountain region. Defenders offers two programs: one compensates ranchers who lose stock to 
wolves, the other rewards ranchers when wolves den on their property (see p. 62).
Delta Waterfowl Foundation Anecdote Material Interviews
In the Dakotas and central Canada, Delta leases private property to establish nesting cover for waterfowl (see 
P- 65).
D e se re t Land a n d  L ivestock Anecdote Material Interviews
Deseret participated with the Utah Division of Wildlife in the m anagem ent of a rare sub-species of cutthroat 
trout by creating a holding pond at their own expense. Deseret recovers its cost by selling catch-and-release 
angling excursions (see p. 70).
|  D ucks U nlim ited Anecdote Material
I  DU  arranges with landowners to promote the quality of waterfowl habitat and maintain private ownership of
• land. They run a private lands program including the Central Valley of California, North Dakota pothole region,
i  and A rkansas lower Mississippi Valley.
t. E C O TR U ST Anecdote
f  Created a  regional planning team of government agencies, major landowners, commercial and recreational
|  fishermen, and others to develop multi-jurisdictional habitat restoration and salmon m anagem ent plan for
|  Willapa Bay, WA, region. ECOTRUST is an offshoot of Conservation International.
t
I E n d an g e red  S p e c ie s  P rogram  Anecdote Material
£ The component of federal policy, administered by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service that identifies and
i  eliminates harm to listed species.
fi
£ E nvironm ental D e fe n se  F und  Anecdote Material
* EDF  leases  water rights from landowners, e.g.. Skyline Ranch W ater Lease (see p. 65).
j R e d -co ck ad ed  W o o d p eck e r Anecdote Material
I  The Red-cockaded Woodpecker Recovery Program plans to offer incentives to landowners based on numbers
t, of individual birds.
I
! F ishA m erica F o u n d atio n  Anecdote
1 Coordinates nonprofit sport-fishing and conservation organizations to conduct small-scale w ater resource and
fish enhancem ent projects in U.S. and its territories.
Fossil Rim W ildlife C e n te r Anecdote Material Interviews
This private group has a permit to breed endangered species at their 3,000-acre ranch in Glen Rose. TX. They 
try to fund the work by selling admission to a drive-through zoo of free-ranging African wildlife.
F ron tlanders Anecdote Material Interviews
A group of public and private conservationists on the eastern front of the Rocky Mountains in Montana who
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 7
r
tried to form a collaborative group. Som e landowners eventually broke off from tbe group in suspicion of the 
conservationists and formed their own, “property rights" group.
Milk R iver B asin  P ro jec t; P rairie  Po tho le  P ro jec t Anecdote
A multiple-partner waterfowl m anagement project guided by the North American Waterfowl M anagement Plan 
with budgets in the millions of dollars.
M ississipp i D ep artm en t o f  Wildlife, F ish e rie s  a n d  P a rk s  Anecdote
The Department is restoring 10,000 acres o f private wetland habitat important to wintering waterfowl and other 
migratory birds using 10-year habitat development agreem ents with private landowners.
Nature Conservancy Anecdote Material Interviews
The Conservancy accepts donations of limited rights to land, usually related to development, which they 
purposely do not use  so as to protect biodiversity. They also reach hand-shake agreem ents to establish 
conservation practices (see pp. 35, 41).
O ce lo t R eco v ery  on  P riv a te  Land Anecdote Material Interviews
The Feline R esearch Program at the C aesar Kleberg Wildlife Research Institute in Kingsville. TX, is trying to
arrange an agreem ent to survey for and possibly reintroduce ocelots to private ranches in southern Texas.
O reg o n  W a te r  T ru st Anecdote Material
This non-profit group leases water rights in order to leave water instream. They lease the rights from 
landowners who normally divert the w ater to irrigate fields (see p. 65).
Pacific  R ivers C ouncil Anecdote
The Council is developing community-based restoration projects for the Rogue, McKenzie and Grande Ronde 
watersheds to create jobs and improve local economic conditions a s  well a s  restore these  ecosystem s.
Patenting genes Anecdote
Corporations and other firms are experimenting with ways to establish property rights over genetic material. 
Jum a (1996) reviews issues in patenting life forms, especially plants, from the perspective of Third World 
Africa.
P e re g r in e  F und  Anecdote Material
The Fund restores birds of prey through partnerships, with permits for handling endangered species (see p.
70).
P lum  C re e k  T im ber C o ., L .P . Anecdote Material Interviews
Plum Creek w as granted an "incidental take permit” pursuant to regulations under the Endangered Species Act
|  for Habitat Conservation Plans (50 CFR 17.22(b)(1)).
Ii
I P riv a te  b reed in g  facilities Anecdote Material
i  Wolf Sanctuaries, a  small group in Indiana, and others like it, have permits to breed red wolves in captivity (see
£ Fossil Rim).
P riv a te  R a n c h e s  o f M on tana , Inc. Anecdote Material
* Private Rancries w as a cooperative of landowners in Montana that attempted to sell access  to their complex of
j properties to hunters. The venture failed.
f
; P ro jec t SH A R E  (S alm on  H ab ita t an d  R iver E n h a n c e m e n t)  Anecdote Material Interviews
•’ A collaborative group of landowners, conservationists, academics, and agencies in and around Washington
Co., Maine, collaborating to restore Atlantic salmon (Salmo salat) by enhancing rivers (see p. 73).
R ed  W olf R eco v ery  P ro g ram  Anecdote Material Interviews
The Red W olf Program  reintroduced red wolves in North Carolina and T ennessee using the non-essential, 
experimental designation under the Endangered Species Act (see p. 71).
R ed w o o d  C o a s t  E nv ironm enta l Law C e n te r  Anecdote
The Center is organizing local groups, governments, and corporations to monitor, rehabilitate, and restore
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R ocky M ountain Elk F oundation  E a se m e n t p rog ram  Anecdote Material Interviews
The Elk Foundation accepts donated easem ents from landowners whose property offers worthy habitat 
features for elk.
Ruffed Grouse Society Anecdote
The Society conducts woodcock habitat and research efforts throughout ruffed grouse range in cooperation 
with federal, state, and pnvate landowners.
Seeking Common Ground Anecdote
A partnership of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, American Farm Bureau Federation. Public Lands 
Council, Wildlife Management Institute. Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. International Association of Fish and 
Wildlife Agencies, USDA Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and private partners such as  the 
Nevada Cattleman’s Association, and supporters like the Boone and Crockett Club, Society for Range 
Management, Isaac Walton League, and the Association of Conservation Districts. These groups work 
together to coordinate grazing and wildlife management on public and private property.
Sport Fishing Institute Anecdote
The Institute has created an information network of anglers, businesses, and local and state governments in 
Great Lakes region to promote fisheries conservation and management
Tennessee Biodiversity Program Anecdote
The T ennessee Conservation League, with support from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, is 
developing geographic information system  databases to provide to community decision-makers in T ennessee 
to encourage land-use planning and land m anagem ent decisions to follow principles of sustainable 
development
Texas Parks and Wildlife Anecdote Material
Leases of private land for Attwater prairie chicken habitat (see p. 64)
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Conservation Reserve Program Anecdote Material
Through the Conservation Reserve, the Department of Agriculture leases private land to establish soil-retaining
|  vegetative cover (see p. 65).
U .S. F ish and  Wildlife S e rv ice  M em oranda  Anecdote Material
The Fish and Wildlife Service has been developing policy for voluntary agreem ents with landowners by 
entering into a variety of agreem ents in the southeastern U.S. and elsewhere. These include memoranda of 
agreement and understanding, and Conservation Agreements, all of which in som e way grant landowners 
|  authority to harm endangered species incidentally to otherwise lawful activities (see p. 71).
s
|  U .S. F ish and  Wildlife S erv ice , P a rtn e rs  fo r Wildlife Anecdote Material Interviews
jj Through the Partners Program, the Fish and Wildlife Service provides technical assistance and cost-sharing
£ projects to private landowners who agree to restore wetland habitats (see p. 67).
Vi*
W etlan d s for th e  A m ericas  Anecdote
| Wetlands conducts workshops on m anagem ent of private wetlands for federal and state agency personnel in
i charge of private lands outreach programs in CA, LA. MA, SC, northern IA, and southern MN. The group
I works also in Mexico.tj
i Wildlife H abitat C ouncil Anecdote
Arranges wildlife habitat improvements on corporate campuses.
W isconsin  W aterfowl A ssocia tion  Anecdote
The Association collaborates with private landowners to restore small wetlands, using volunteers to identify 
restoration sites and conduct on-site evaluations.
END OF TABLE 1
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My methods for collecting these data came from the field of qualitative research. 
Qualitative research is a broad term covering the work of scholars whose data are observations, 
interviews, documents, archives, and artifacts of everyday human life. My interview technique 
was the “unstructured ... open-ended ethnographic (in-depth) interview” (Fontana and Frey 
1994:365). It is a normal conversation that continues throughout the study because 
"conversations, albeit intermittent, are like ordinary relationships, capable of continuity" 
(Schatzman and Strauss 1973:74).
For each interview, I found a person who has reached agreement, arranged a meeting, 
and asked for his or her story about reaching agreement. The only influence I intended to exert 
was "stimulating the inarticulate, loosening the tongue-tied, [and] steering the 'run-aways'" 
(Schatzman and Strauss 1973:74). I ended each conversation by thanking the person, explaining 
that I would study the transcript of our talk and stay in touch. I also asked to be referred to other 
people, preferably those with a different experience with agreement. I tape-recorded most 
interviews (n=20), and wrote notes during the others (n=6).
The field of qualitative research is wide, with various methods. The field is, like the data
themselves, "open-ended" and resistant to "a single, umbrella-like paradigm" (Denzin and Lincoln
) 1995:352). Perhaps the only commonality among the various philosophical types of qualitative
«
] fieldwork is its strength, which "has always been the 'thick description' of the local, which is
I glossed over altogether by most other methods" (Snow and Morrill 1995:360). Geertz (1983)called a "thick description" one that explains the meaning of actions for their actors as explicitly as f possible. It describes habits of thought and action that people have acquired by living in their
| community; it describes whatever one needs to know or believe in order to act acceptably among
1 members of a culture. This cultural analysis is meant to describe, whereas traditional
| hypothesis-testing is meant to verify. "The analysis of [culture i s ] ... not an experimental science
| in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz 1983:38). A study of
| landowners' culture is designed to describe how these people reached agreement, not to verify a
I preconceived notion of why they are reached.
| One variety of qualitative research is called grounded theory, and its developers have
concluded, after reviewing it with ethnography, phenomenological approach, life histories, and 
conversational analysis that the purposes of the different approaches "don't appreciably differ for 
different researchers" (Strauss and Corbin 1990:21). They describe qualitative research as a 
"nonmathematical analytic procedure ... [using] data gathered by a variety of means [that 
include] observations ... interviews ... documents, books, videotapes, and even data that have 
been quantified for other purposes such as census data" (Strauss and Corbin 1990:18). The
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analytic or interpretive work centers on coding, which is the process of labeling observations, 
statements, events and other elements of qualitative data and then organizing them into 
categories. This is the challenging process of looking at something obvious, like the conversation 
between an agency forester and a hiker at a trailhead, and describing it. This is the scientific skill 
of observation to which Teddy Roosevelt referred when speaking to the American Museum in 
1918: "what is most needed is not the ability to see what very few people can see, but to see what 
almost anybody can see, but nobody takes the trouble to look at" (Roosevelt 1918:390).
Analyzing Data
I analyzed the interviews by classifying concepts in the text. This created a hierarchy, or 
typology, of concepts. Starting with a text, such as an interview transcript, I labeled segments 
with descriptive codes that summarized their meaning. The statement, "I got hold of him to find 
out if w e might plan a stream restoration project," was coded as "contacting" and sub-coded as 
"cold-call" or "acquaintance" to differentiate contacts made for the first time from contacts made 
in the course of a relationship. I then entered codes in The Ethnograph, version 4.0 (Seidel et al. 
1995), which enabled me to list all segments from all interviews under each code, creating a
| hierarchy of concepts. This hierarchy became the outline of what I described below as Reaching
i
I Agreement.
l
j Reporting the Analysis
|  In reporting words from the interviews, I have tried to represent (i.e„ re-present what
| was presented to me) the many things that happen during an agreement without trying to isolate
I any one thing that makes agreement work. I attempt to represent peoples' views faithfully by
i
j quoting them as frequently as possible to illustrate the concepts.
t
f
|  Creating an Incentive
i
( This story from a conservationist employed by a federal incentive program shows that
i incentives are created by an offer to "trade-off" interests.
s GN: "I told him, I said, 'Hey, these are the kind of things you can do to improve your
operation. N ow , w hat can we do to help you?' It was just a trade-off... to help do some 
duck habitat, or whatever, wetland enhancement and yet w e might gain off-site watering, 
some cross-fencing, grazing. You tell them what you wanted and it was seeing if you 
could get it done.
"Obviously, they saw  just the ... they see the opportunities, from there on, it was sort of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
saying, 'Well what can w e do to help you out?"’
Focusing on trade-offs between conservationists and landowners not only clarifies 
incentives, but also focuses on a void of knowledge identified by previous scholars.
Coase (1984:231), the economist, said, "Modem institutional economics should study man 
as he is, acting within the constraints imposed by real institutions." Real institutions, for Coase 
(1984) include the local customs that influence face-to-face encounters.
The failure of conservationists to recognize local customs and other real institutions 
frustrated Leopold (1942:295), the biologist, who complained that "we deal with bureaus, policies, 
laws, and programs which are the symbols of our problem, instead o f with resources, products, 
and land-users which are the problems."
Mangun and Mangun (1991:3), the conservation policy analysts, saw  the emphasis on 
rules and procedure as making conservation top-heavy: "the absence of a prominent role for local 
government [has created a] dual federalism with the federal government and state governments 
dominant within their ow n jurisdictions."
Sociologists have described the difference between formal national institutions and 
informal local ones as the difference between an "imaginary and mechanical structure" such as 
laws and policies and a "real and organic life" of customs and habits (Tonnies 1988:33).
The bottom line, as field conservationists can tell you from experience, is that unless 
conservationists understand and work with local people, conservation will not change 
management on private land (Thomas 1997).
Reaching Agreement
Consider this statement.
"...once you ’ve made the initial contact—you’ve decided on who you want to contact, 
when you want to contact them, and you start talking to them—there's several things that 
you do or don’t do."
j
; This person encapsulated agreement as a process depending right behavior. In this
section I describe the process and the right behavior used by people I interviewed. The main 
stages are Starting, Contacting, Listening/Talking, and Offering. These stages differ slightly 
between agreements reached between two people and those reached by groups of people 
working together, and I will point out those differences along the way.
GN:
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Starting
Meetings, Personal Visits, and Simple Projects
These are the ways people went out to find potential partners. Agreements started when 
a conservationist or landowner had an interest at stake that motivated them to start talking about 
agreement. Beginnings were in group meetings, personal visits, and simple projects.
RF: "We started in, we met down in Charlotte, North Carolina, where the APA meeting was,
and everybody thought it was a great idea. We met that Spring, I'd say w e started 
January 94, calling up and talking about who do w e need to talk to.
"Then w e had a meeting on the ESA and [PN] was there.”
GN: "We decided to just knock on some doors essentially and see if these folks were interested
in restoring those wetlands."
GS: "Sometimes it started with something as simple as a goose nesting structure, giving the
landowner, you know it's kind of like a free sample. You might say and we'd give them a 
goose nesting structure ... in fact, we've given them something they can put out there and 
make a connection with wildlife to and a lot of time that the following year might lead to 
a call to [us for another deal]."
GS: "The other thing that really sort of kicked off the Partners program was the Fish and
Wildlife Service involvement in the Blackfoot was w e acquired that property along 
Highway 200, the Blackfoot waterfowl Production Area."
Spending Time in the Community
Starting is more them just encountering people. GS explained that by traveling to and 
from jobs on "that property along Highway 200" he and his partner had many opportunities to 
meet landowners in the community. He pointed out that this was possible because they had the 
time to spend in the community.
GS: "The thing that agencies don't have because we see everything in terms of fiscal years
and acres and dollars expended and upper management wants results. They don't want 
to see you invest a year of your life or of a staff or staff hours and in a project and get to
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that year and say, 'O.K. how many acres and how many dollars have you spent?' And 
you say, 'Haven't spent very much but I spent a lot of time in Trixi’s bar and gotten to 
know the network of the community and developing trust A lot of agencies are not 
willing to invest that kind of time on the front end of it  I'm not sure whether some 
agencies either can afford to do that because they've got such a huge workload and such 
limited staff."
Contacting
Once some concept of agreement is in mind, people looking to deal begin meeting 
possible partners with the intent of reaching agreement These possible partners could be 
individuals or groups.
"I take it on as an individual project, go down, meet with them, go to their club, go to 
their supper."
"We didn't know a lot of the players. Went over there it was kind of non-traditional 
property for us because, unique property, because it had river frontage ... called a 
meeting together in 19 it must of been fall of 89 w e brought the Forest Service; Fish, 
Wildlife, and Parks; highway folks, Ducks Unlimited, I think we even had Trout 
Unlimited there and w e said, Hey we're new landowners in the valley what would, like, 
how would...((that was the end of the statement))".
"We called them and talked to them, but best thing to do is meet them somewhere, you 
can't talk to them over the phone, best thing to do is look a man in the eye, you got to see 
if he's blinking or turning around when you're talking. No, we'd make a point of i t ... call 
and say can you meet me for breakfast or something."
"We had to do a lot of work to identify the landowners..."
One landowner they knew, JS, said, "I tried to get them around to the people who would  
be willing to sit down and actually talk."
GN: "We talked at length about the best ways to approach landowners. It's a salesman's you
know you really out selling a product so do you write letters? do telephone calls? do 
you knock on doors? do you inconvenience the landowners during haying season while
RF:
GS:
RF:
GS:
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he's calving I mean all these things come up and there's right and wrong ways to do them 
and our gut reaction has been that a telephone call, you know, like a vacuum cleaner 
salesman calling you at night, 'Ay, I'm with the Fish and Wildlife Service, w e want to 
restore a wetland out there are you interested?' Click. 'No I'm not interested.' So that's 
out of the question. A letter, we only get about on the average probably 10 -15% response 
back on letters sent out on the p a st”
Contact was easy for conservationists who spent enough time in the community that local 
people could get in touch with them.
JS: "I went through [LL] and got ahold of [GS], I think is how we did it. I can't remember for
sure ... They'd been out looking at things before, been up and down the streams there."
Talking/Listening
When these people say they are talking, they mean they are "in the talking stage", as in: 
"we were already in the talking stage by then"; or,
"It's surprising what happens when they get together and start talking."
In the talking stage of an agreement, these people are sharing ideas about what they 
might do together, but they are not yet proposing to act. They are learning and beginning to care 
about others' interests or activities and sometimes they are identifying conflicts between others' 
interests or activities and their own. There is also talking that doesn't pertain to the interests in 
the deal; this might be called small-talk, which also is a preface to action. Talking is a tool for 
venting and compromise.
Listening is more than just being present while som eone was talking. It means 
understanding and respecting another person's interests. Listening is the opposite of having 
made up one's mind:
GS: "I think everybody listened somewhat, but [one group] said they had their big plan no
matter what was said by who at that meeting."
WS: "[GS] came in with his eyes and his mind open, and listened. He didn't come in and say,
'This is your problem, you've got to do this, this, and this.'
"He made you feel like you were worth something. Whether you were having a bad day
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or a bad year."
JS: "They ((GS and GN)) found out it was a whole lot better to be open to our concerns and
then maybe come in with their concerns afterwards."
Talking/Listening is the biggest part of agreement, so here is a summary of the sub- 
headings:
1. Small-talk
2. Privacy
3. Sharing an idea of something to do together, not an offer
4. A way of learning and caring
5. A way of venting and resolving misunderstandings
6. Holding Your Tongue
Small-talk
Before sharing ideas about what could be done, or even venting or learning about
? another's interests, the talking stage is about small-talk.
k
 ̂ GS: "Hey, how  are things going, you know, the weather over here blah, blah, blah. I think
f that helps a lot setting the stage to begin to talk about getting to where you want to go. I
|  think if you  go in and you immediately, boom, go to talking to the guy about restoring a
|  wetland or something you're going to fail with that approach, that's just been my
j experience and then [GN] would tell you the same thing."
i
jf Small talk seems easy enough, but one must avoid "simple things that could turn
17
j landowners off' (GN).
[ GN: "You try to start off a conversation with a landowner talking about crops, weather,
f
1 talking about his cows and what not, but you could mess up. Something like, drive up
L
; and say, 'Your cows are looking good this year.'
r
I don't know  what a good cow looks like from a bad cow and you know by saying, you 
know', 'your cows are looking good this year' when maybe they're looking bad to him and 
you, or crops, you know, same way, if you don't know what you're talking about... I've 
seen more agency people shoot themselves in the foot by trying to buffalo their way 
through talking about... trying to connect with the landowner on ag-related stuff if they
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don't know what they're talking about."
G: "So how do you do it?"
GN: "You say, 'How are your crops doing this year?'
"They say, 'Oh, boy it’s a great year!’
"You say, 'Yeah, yeah, things are looking good.'
You don't have to know a lot about it, but you just don't stick your foot in your mouth 
right off the start I've got a gut reaction on how  the weather's been but I don't — from a 
wildlife perspective — but I'm not sure what that means for his hay crops."
A genuine concern for the other person's situation makes for good small-talk.
GS: "I always try' to ask about you know, personal, some of that stuff sounds corny and kooky
but you'd be amazed at people's human behavior, you know, lik e ... the other day ... I 
think the first half an hour w e talked about calving. And talked about problems with 
scours and its  a wet spring. That kind o f stuff made him feel a lot more at ease with me 
he felt like I was, you know, I had a genuine concern about his way of life and he's having 
a tough year, he's lost 80 calves this year to scours and so those kind of things."
k.
Privacy
I Some landowners and conservationists made a clear point that the talking phase should
I be kept q u iet
i
|  BP: "People don't like open house."
f
E 
i
I One person explained that he parks his unmarked truck out of sight from neighbors so
4
s the landowner need not worry about them becoming curious about what he or she is considering
£ doing on the land.
Sharing an idea of something to do together, not an offer
RF: "I got talking with other companies, and w e all talk back and forth, and I said we've
ow ned this land for hundred years and have never cut and run, so we have a good story 
to tell. We're already doing a good job, but getting no credit for i t ... so I told them what 
we're doing and what we want to do and how we're going to protect this and do these 
things.
"[BC] and I talked it over some beers and he said, yeah, we need to do something along 
those lines."
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Similar talk goes on with small landowners in one-on-one deals.
GN: "We got on the ranch that way and then we just got visiting about different things we
could do, things you know. I mentioned things I would like to find a way to fix some of 
these things and they came up with ideas and we were just back and forth then."
A way of learning and caring
Talking helps these people find things out: the way each other feels, and also what their 
interests are and what they are doing.
RF: "If we're not talking then we don't know what each other is doing and we don't care. But
if w e get together and can say you almost ruined us last year, then w e get some free flow  
of information and get a lot of people involved."
"The group has been a process of getting things out on the table—[it's been] a coordination 
mechanism of all the entities' duties, inclinations, and responsibilities, [so these] are all 
available at once—it makes them more evident
"There's a lot of caution people use at those meetings; they are careful about what they 
expose regarding what they'll support it's a negotiation, it's frustrating at one level, but 
it's understandable."
"We found out nobody's talking, everybody's too busy. Things don't happen until we 
stop long enough to go out and talk with all of our state fish and game agencies and other 
publics. Otherwise, there's lots of problems [from] just not spending a lot of time on the 
front end, talking about what works."
For example.
"We have irrigation dams and we're finding if we release the water at the bottom of the 
dam instead of letting it spill over the top, we're releasing colder water, which helps the 
salmon. N ow  if someone came along and said don't do anything in this stretch of the 
river because it's salmon habitat, we wouldn't know what we were doing wrong, but if 
we did w e would stop it or maybe do something to help. So these lines of 
communication, a lot of little things, but added up it helps the entire effort."
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A way of venting and resolving misunderstandings
In talking, one biologist was able to clarify several concerns of a landowner that had 
nothing to do with the possible agreement.
GN: "I was able to say, well, that's not really true we do pay a set amount [of property tax],
"'Well what about weeds7 You guys aren't going to control your w eed s/
"No. We are going to control the weeds over there.
"'Well, what about fire? I’m worried about fire.'
"Well, w e plan to do some limited haying, we plan to do som e limited grazing.
"So those things helped him feel more comfortable. But you get through the first half 
hour, that's all you do, you listen to him and kinda see his point of view."
Holding Your Tongue
Part of succeeding in Talking is holding your tongue. Sometimes this requires biting 
your tongue.
WS: "Sometimes it tests your patience a little. The one that gets me every time ... when they
say you've got to get back to nature. If I hear anyone say that I know I'm in deep shit and 
I better keep my mouth shut"
Other times, holding your tongue is just a matter of patience.
I GN: "When the rancher takes me on a drive through his place there's always things that I'm
seeing. You know, I'm seeing drained wetlands I'm seeing over grazed riparian areas, 
weeds, I mean, poor timber management. I mean, every property whether its private or 
public has got problems, but what I don't do is come off right away and say, Geez, there’s 
j a drained wetland right there, boy, w e should move these corrals.'
"I just allow him to show me his property and get off his chest what he wants to show  
me, something he's been thinking about: putting in a pond or offset water or whatever."
This last point, about patience and holding your tongue, was described as critical not 
only for avoiding arguments, but also for setting up the Offering stage.
Offering
Offering is the stage where negotiating begins. A person who reviewed an earlier draft of 
this paper, disagreed that any negotiation takes place in the Talking/Listening stage. From his 
perspective, negotiation begins when specific commitments to projects are offered.
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Wait for the Right Time
The time for moving to the offering stage is when the talking is done, which depends on 
the person you are talking with and your ability to read him or her.
SM: "[we're at the] end of the formative process stage, entering the 'doing' stage."
GN: "Sometimes it might be two years down the road before you say, 'Y'know I...'
"You get to that thing you saw  on the first trip. 'I noticed that drained wetland back 
there, what do you think about restoring it?'
"And if you bring it up right away ... like a conservation easem ent... if that's the first 
thing out of your mouth, pack your bags because he’s going to send you."
JS: "You've got to sit back and look at the people, and ease into certain ones. There are some
you can just go up to and talk to and you're fine, other ones, they're going to [be 
skeptical]. It works that way."
"I think it varies with each landowner. They all have their different signals, but the thing 
is you got to Ieam to get to know them, to know what their signals are, to feel a comfort 
level, to have them feel comfortable with you. And what I hope is that -  when I know I’m 
in with the landowners -  when he sees me as [GS] and not as [my organization] and 
when that point happens then I think you can move on to those issues.
"Sometimes that’s the first time you sit down at the table and sometimes its ... not for a 
long time. I've ... sat down for the first time and within the first day and visited with 
people about conservation easements and come away from that meeting feeling like,
'Yep, we'll put an easement on this place.' And other people you know and som e of them 
we've been waiting for three, for four years.”
"They develop more and more of a comfort level with [us] and that generally leads to an 
opportunity to bring them to a discussion of maintain a rural lifestyle, you know, the 
family rancher, [and] you have discussions about easements."
Appeal to a Person’s Interests
Offers appeal to the person's interests, for example, a landowner's management 
objectives.
GN: "I told him, I said, 'Hey, these are the kind of things you can do to improve your
GS:
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operation. Now, what can we do to help you?' It was just a trade-off... to help do some 
duck habitat, or whatever, wetland enhancement and yet we might gain off-site watering, 
some cross-fencing, grazing. You tell them what you wanted and it was seeing if you  
could get it done.
"Obviously, they saw just the ... they see the opportunities, from there on, it was sort of 
saying, 'Well what can we do to help you out?'"
"Then you are able to say, 'Well, what are your goals long-term? What do you want to 
see with your ranch?' That then generally, in the Blackfoot, at least, [leads to] 
conservation easements."
Part of a successful offer is ability to customize it.
JS: "Now [one group] is coming in with their new grazing things ... it's a wreck. They got
their set lines from headquarters or someplace, wherever they did them, and it's generic 
for everywhere in the world and you can't do that, it just doesn't work. They're coming 
out with that and it just isn't working at all. They are setting themselves back ten years."
A Generic Offer at First
Some people start with a general idea of what agreements could be reached.
RF: "((reading)) 'SHARE is open to people committed to an ethical approach to land
stewardship to consider all forest and natural resources including anadromous and 
resident species of fish.'
"We were trying to keep anyone from saying, 'Oh I can't do that because it flies in the 
face of...((sentence trails off)).'
"It was a generic approach at first, but we knew we could get narrowed in later. We 
|  were criticized by several people for having a wide-brush approach, and w e did, because
if you came in and saw this narrow little space you had to crawl through, that 
discourages people and they ride off."
Gathering Information
People bring science into agreement all throughout the process, but it is during the 
offering stage when science plays the biggest role. It can hold up the agreement process.
TF: "The delay right now has been to wait for the Scientific Group [to answer] What do we
mean by recovery? And how do w e get there?"
fr
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SS: "The information will become truth for further talks in the Restoration Team."
Gathering information is hard because: (1) people have "saved the sticky issues for last";
(2) "nobody has time or money to be sure" of all decisions; and, (3) "science is not pure and 
absolute, players interpret science differently and derive standards and guidelines differently." 
The upshot of this situation was summarized by SM:
SM; "It's our job to fit the science into the politics. We'll either have to deal with these issues
or come out and say that we're not going to."
Referrals
The final aspect o f offering is knowing when interests do not match.
GN: "You gotta know what your program is, what all the programs [offered by others] are,
when you sit dow n with the landowner. You might say, 'Well I'm interested in waterfowl 
habitat'
"He may not have any wetlands to restore or be interested but he might be interested in 
the grazing system or moving his corral so you have to know, well, you know, 'Maybe we 
can't help you with this but maybe Fish, Wildlife, and Parks has got a program.' 'Well 
this is more orientated toward fisheries...'
"But if you're going to refer somebody, don't just give him the [phone] number, /k n o w , 
'Here ya go,' and forget about him. Make the call, set up the meeting, pick the guy up,
and go there together. Otherwise... ((sentence trails off))"
I Other Concepts
f
(• People raised other concepts that applied generally to reaching agreement,
i
|  Ownership
Ownership, also referred to as "buy-in," describes the sense among people working 
j together that the plan resulting from their work is theirs, and, therefore, they will make it, use it,
i
; and care for it well.
- GK: "It takes local knowledge. The more you localize, the more potential buy-in, the better
the solution, and longer lasting."
Accountability
Related to ownership is the concept of accountability.
H-
?
I
i
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KH: "There's a peer pressure th ing ... if a player is blatantly resisting, it might actually make
things worse for them ... you have to think hard about the long-term repercussions of 
your actions today.
"When everybody's at the table, you don't have many s.o.b.'s who will say, This is my 
position and I’m sticking to it.'"
Lacking Resources
There was wide agreement that lack of resources — time, labor, materials, equipment, and 
money — is a fundamental limitation to agreement
KM: "The limitation on strength of state-based institutions is finances, just like at the federal
lev e l... 'precluded' is a workload analysis."
This refers to the "warranted but precluded" decision by which U. S. Fish and W ildlife 
Service passed up its opportunity to take authority for bull trout and left responsibility with 
Montana.
GK: "Having the Restoration Team shows that the problem is bigger than any one interest. It
allows us to pool resources."
SS: "Now we're approaching the hand-off to the watershed groups and field people [who]
will be assigned the additional duty of sitting in on the watershed groups."
Some responsibilities have been funded ("we took a lot of projects and pieced together 
enough funding"), but many have been added to "full time" responsibilities. Not only are the 
"field people" dealing with "additional duty," but the Restoration Team members themselves have 
squeezed these meetings into their schedules. The same problem has been recognized for 
members of the public who will be asked to join watershed groups, or who are trying to find time 
to participate in the process. These people, it was noted, "have jobs too" and may already be 
involved in other citizen advisory groups and, therefore, "may be burnt out."
Leadership
Leadership was generally described as the ability and willingness among participants to 
"commit [their group’s] interests or policy to matters affecting bull trout." Often, the Governor's 
leadership was recognized: "... Governor [Racicot] is an outstanding individual. He is w illing to
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deal with conflict and is interested in the gamut o f resources." "With this governor, Montana has 
a strong record of these kinds of processes." Several members listed a governor's commitment as 
necessary for success in any state-based effort, and especially because this leadership w ould draw 
the state wildlife agency into a "willingness to budget for it" and to maintain the necessary 
"viewpoint, number of people, and the qualifications" to succeed. Less often than the need for 
gubernatorial leadership, but also present, was the view  that the Restoration Team members must 
lead. One supervisor considered it his "job to bring field people in on the goal."
Alternatives
People considering agreement are influenced by their options for getting what they want. 
TF: "[This process is] another path. The recovery plan [written by the group] may turn out as
good as what the Fish and Wildlife Service might have done, but I'm not sure w e  have the 
tools [to implement it] that the Fish and Wildlife Service might There are tools w e don't 
have because there is no [Endangered Species Act].”
The tools TF referred to are regulations that compel people to follow the recovery plan. 
Another person considered those regulatory tools as a hindrance and an encouragement to reach 
agreement instead.
GK: "What makes these solutions possible is that they're non-regulatory. Federal law  creates
authority that casts a chilling effect. If people can agree to a middle course, then each 
entity can advance at least part of their agenda ... you can waste your time in the 
legislature, or you can collaborate."
Momentum
People described momentum as if it were inertia: the tendency for something at rest to 
stay put, or the tendency of something moving to keep moving.
KH: "Once a process gets going, the feeling develops that you don't want to fail. Once
momentum is going, you don't want to see it fail."
PF: "A certain amount of progress is necessary to maintain credibility."
LP: "Fear [of the Endangered Species Act]— that's what's driving the bull trout case."
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External forces
People on the Bull Trout Restoration Team described three main external forces: (1) 
possibility of lawsuits challenging the process; (2) effect of publicity on the discussion; and, (3) 
frustration from the Governor's office. At a recent the Restoration Team meeting, a citizen brought 
a video- and sound-recording team. One the Restoration Team member explained that "some 
people are concerned about the trustworthiness o f this process." "What you saw here today 
probably was preparation for a lawsuit." Members were not equally concerned about lawsuits, 
some saw them as unavoidable possibilities, others expected that they would "reel from that" and 
measured their words accordingly.
One member described routine public attendance at meetings as also affecting the 
process: "When i t s  a public forum, it’s uncomfortable and stifles [discussion] som ew hat., it’s the 
cost of public accountability." On the other hand, some members see greater publicity as an 
important objective of the process — they want to "get bull trout in the news". This illustrates a 
fundamental challenge in balancing local interest and national interest. Supposedly, local 
interests will be represented in watershed groups. The national interest, however, is supposed to 
be represented by the agencies. They do this through the National Environmental Policy Act 
|  (NEPA), but no one yet knows where the NEPA process fits in the Restoration Team process,
f Opposing the inhibiting effect of potential legal challenges and routine public scrutiny is
|  pressure for faster results coming from "the Governor's office [which is] expressing some
t1
|  frustration with the slowness." This factor was described as if "the Governor is saying, ’I've held
|  back the feds [by convening the Restoration Team], but we got to get something done.'"
I Conclusion
i
t The process o f agreement is not a set of steps to be followed as in a recipe.
i
i GK: "Anyone looking for a cook-book will be disappointed ... this is amorphous."
f
i Nevertheless, there are conditions and components necessary for progress. A community
i
j needs trust and relationships among its members before those people begin talking about their
f interests and the possibilities for agreement. A certain amount of starting is required before
contacts are made. Then, as I heard plainly, a certain amount of listening and talking must go one 
before "you can move on." "Sometimes that's the first time you sit down at the table and 
sometimes its ... not for a long time.1'
Agreement is a complex phenomenon, but it can be likened to a pyramid. Leopold (1939)
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proposed a pyramid as a model of ecological relationships and I believe the same model fits 
agreement by analogy. The biotic pyramid consists of layers, each a little smaller than the one 
below it, that build up to a cap (Fig. 3). "Each successive layer depends on those below for food 
and often for other services, and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above"
(Leopold 1939:268). In agreement, the layers are: starting, contacting, listening/talking, offering, 
and then the agreement itself.
Though the pyramid model captures most of the agreement process I observed, it cannot 
account for som e details on which landowners and conservationists in my study disagreed.
These details are:
1. Buying land may or may not be a good way to enter a community and be
available. Some people spoke of this as helping, others spoke of it as a deadly 
mistake for public agencies or non-profit groups, with whom it fuels fears of 
public take-over of private land.
2. "Progressive thinking" seems to mean willingness to try new ways of managing
| land and dealing with landowners. It could mean, however, acceptable thinking.
5
3
• 3. Agreem ent My interviews focused on reaching agreement, but the act of
|  agreement itself probably has its own meaning. I hope that in the process of
I
|  reaching agreement, a landowner and conservationist learn or make whatever
|  rules are necessary for the act of agreement itself.
r
b
j? Finally, because of these details, and because this description of agreement is not
S
a designed to be generalizable to every community, conservationists and landowners should use
I
E this model only as a first idea of how to reach agreement in their communities.
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Although trusting relationships are necessary for voluntary agreement, people also need 
terms for their agreements. These economic details are difficult in conservation because land 
blends public and private ownerships. Some public interests are affected by how  private land­
owners manage their land; therefore, the government protects those interests by regulating 
private land management. Normal, necessary, and legal uses of land can be stopped if these uses 
harm endangered species. On the other hand, as Lueck (1995) showed, private landowners can, 
in effect, ow n a public wildlife population if his or her property is large enough to encompass the 
range o f the population. In this chapter, I show how landowners and conservationists have 
divided these values in the terms of their agreements.
This overlap was seen by the first conservationists. Theodore Roosevelt saw "game 
preservation" happening either by landed proprietors maintaining private reserves "with a sense 
of public spirit and due regard for the interests and feelings of others" or by the "far preferable 
and more democratic way ... by a system of public preserves" (quoted by Leopold 1933:18). The 
heart of the problem—the overlap in interests—was described by Leopold (1949:213): "When the 
private landowner is asked to perform som e unprofitable act for the good o f the community, he 
today assents only with outstretched palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but 
{ when it costs only fore-thought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable."
j' Sorting out the overlapping interests in land is a problem of separating them so each
| party can benefit from the values they w an t It is like the common parable of the orange: one
r
5 person wants the rind as an ingredient in a cake, the other wants the fruit, so cutting the orange in
half w ill not satisfy their interests, but peeling it will. In one of the cases in this study, a land­
owner needed to impound water for irrigation and release it back to a stream. Conservationists 
complained that water released over the dam was too warm for salmon in the stream. They 
f resolved the problem by agreeing that the landowner would release water from under the dam,
| which would be cooler than water from over the top.
t
f Types of Agreements
t The Types of Agreements I describe vary in simplicity and legality, giving multiple
t views o f how  people are arranging their competing interests (Table 2). Below, I describe a set of
[ example cases proceeding from the simplest ownership arrangement to more complex arrange-
! ments involving multiple people. Along the way I point out the differences between legally
[ binding and non-binding agreements. In the next section. Factors in the Typology (page 57), I
' generalize the differences among the main types of agreement here into Types o f Ownership
(page 58) and Elements of Exchange (page 59).
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Table 2. Main Types of Agreements.
Registry Agreement: a handshake agreement between landowner and 
conservationist to protect or manage a  feature of a  private tract.
Reward and Compensation: a conservation group pays a landowner 
when a predator dens or damages livestock on a private tract.
Lease: a landowner sells near-complete ownership rights to his or her 
land to another “person” for a limited time.
Cost-share: a public agency shares with a landowner the cost of a land 
managem ent project.
Easement and Estate Management Agreements: a landowner donates 
managem ent rights to a conservation group, or otherwise lowers 
the value of his or her property, in exchange for tax relief.
Franchise: a landowner buys near-complete ownership of wildlife from a 
state agency in exchange for limited access and management 
rights given to the state.
Private Management: a private group or landowner receives limited 
( rights to m anage a species of wildlife, for example, by raising a
I captive population for release in the wild.
| Exemptions: the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service exem pts landowners
! and other private citizens from regulations designed to protect
|  endangered and threatened species.
£
i Working Together and Miscellany: several instances of agreement take
f place among people who have gathered to reach consensus or
* collaborate on some set of rival interests. Land owners and man-
f .
I agers sometimes alter their practices in accord with the group and
I other times will invest labor, money, equipment, and other re-
l  sources in projects shared by other members of the group.
Except for Franchise, Estate Management Agreement, and Exemptions, the name of each 
type would be recognized by anyone involved with that type of agreement. I needed to apply the 
names for Franchise, Estate Management Agreement, and Exemptions because people in the field 
talked only about specific examples of these and did not have a name for the category. Also, I 
have left out of this list fee-simple purchase of land. Purchases are used to achieve conservation 
goals, but I focused this study on solutions to conservation problems that leave the private sector 
substantially involved.
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These are the headings in my typology of agreement, below each one is a wide space for 
individuality. Instead of trying to specify the typology to that level, I present the factors by which 
agreements differ. First I review the headings, pointing out their differences, and concepts they 
feature, then I describe the coding scheme I used to define their differences. This scheme can be 
used to describe individual agreements.
Registry Agreements
The Nature Conservancy has a "Registry Program" to keep track of landowners w'ho 
have registered the existence of a rare plant or other feature of the land that the landowner is 
protecting, maintaining, or developing (Hoose 1981). Each registry landowner has agreed with 
TNC, which may be more or less specifically defined in writing, to protect "highly significant 
natural features critical to the preservation of natural diversity," or something to that effect. 
Normally, the agreement is consummated with som e official recognition of the landowner in the 
form of a plaque, certificate, or sign for the property, and the agreement is maintained through 
subsequent attempts to remain in touch.
Notice that the Conservancy brokers this deal between its members (the customers) and 
the landowners (the suppliers). The brokering role of the conservation party to voluntary agree­
ments is repeated in the following examples. The distinction is important because it highlights 
the fact that these agreements are ways to resolve problems of public goods; on the other hand, 
the distinction is not so important because the conservationist and the landowner are the parties 
! who directly negotiate. Conservationists make their case to "customers" extensively, not inten-
] sively, by advertising and mailing.
I "Registry" is the simplest agreement I found: two parties are involved and nothing is
\ legally binding. N o control of land is transferred in the initial agreement, but some costs incurred
|  can be seen as part of establishing control through a future contract TNC is aware that such
| agreements can improve prospects of securing binding legal agreements in the management of
I the land. Costs arise in delivering impressive plaques and signs and hiring effective negotiators
I to meet wdth landowners initially to establish the agreement and then subsequently to maintain
t the relationship.
|  Rewards and Compensation
| In Montana, when a landowmer's property is either damaged by wolves or grizzly bears,
I the non-profit group Defenders of Wildlife will pay for the damage. Defenders also will pay a
[ "reward" of S5,000 to landowners on whose property a wolf pair produces pups. Although
: Defenders represents its membership, who as I mentioned above are part of the agreement, think
' of this as another simple, two-party, non-binding agreement. Rewards and Compensation
agreements involve at least two concepts that distinguish it from Registry Agreements: economic 
property rights, and reciprocity.
Economic property rights, unlike legal property rights, are the rights a person can actu­
ally protect, not the ones he or she is entitled to by law'. The difference is between de facto and de 
jure rights. One noteworthy feature of Defenders’ deal is that he is buying something the land­
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owner does not legally have to sell. It would be a violation of the Endangered Species Act for a 
landowner to disrupt the den of an endangered species, but it is within the landowner's ability to 
do so. Cheung (1970) distinguished property rights and economic property rights: the latter 
describes not what is legally owned, but what can be controlled, or "one's ability to exercise 
choices over a good" (Allen 1991:3). Basically, your economic property right is defined by your 
ability to deter thieves.
Defenders calls its programs rewards and compensations, and there is no binding legal 
requirement that the landowners do anything in return, but they hope they have bought some 
tolerance. "We just have to believe that ranchers will think, 'Geez, wolves aren't so bad to have 
around.'"
R eciprocity  refers to what Coase (1960) called the reciprocal nature of problems o f social 
cost. Moral considerations aside, Coase argued, a polluter could pay neighbors for the right to 
clean air, or the neighbors could pay the polluter for the right to pollute. Defenders recognizes that 
the payments could go either way and, because landowners have economic property rights to 
wolves. Defenders tries to buy these economic property rights to kill wolves.
Rewards and Compensation are more complex also because more checking is required to 
be sure that all payments are deserving and so, as a representative of Defenders says, "we can 
protect the integrity of the fund." In the case of a reward, Defenders pays a rancher $5,000 after 
the litter reaches approximately 10 months of age. Documentation of the exchange is accom­
plished by a visit to the den-area by Defenders personnel. Defenders, in turn, reports to its con-
\ tributors through its various publications,
f
h
f Lease
i A lease is a formalized version of the agreements already described; leases show how
|  these simple agreements can become more complex. A Registry Agreement resembles the
|  Conservation Reserve and Adopt-A-Pothole Programs I describe below, and Defenders' reward
|  program resembles the lease a horse-owner would pay for stabling his or her animal on a
|  neighbor's land (though I will not describe those details). The final example is of a hunting lease,
|  which is a thought-provoking model for endangered species conservation.
r
IV
| Conservation Reserve
3 The Conservation Reserve Program gives the Department of Agriculture the money to lease
3 access and management rights from private landowners. For monthly lease payments, the
; government specifies the cover crop that will retire the cropland. The attribute of land traded is
the cropland, by which I refer to the capacity of the land to produce a crop. Between the Depart­
ment of Agriculture and the taxpayers it represents, and whose money it spends, the attribute of 
land traded is the stability of the soil, or the condition of land opposite of erodibility.
Part of the greater complexity of this lease is in the role of a government agency. Ameri­
can citizens expressed a demand for stable soil through the policy process resulting in the Food 
Security Act of 1985 and the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990. These laws 
established the Conservation Reserve Program as a way for the Department of Agriculture to
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stabilize soil for taxpayers. The Department satisfies taxpayers by leasing the use of arable land 
from farmers so that the land can be planted in such a way as to eliminate erosion. Separation 
between the attribute of land sought by conservationists (stability) and the attribute of land 
traded with a landowner (cropland), is a common fact of voluntary agreements for conservation.
Adopt-a-Pothole
Adopt-a-Pothole is a similar program run by a private, non-profit conservation group, the 
Delta Waterfowl Foundation. Delta leases private property from landowners who restore or 
maintain upland vegetation surrounding ponds (i.e., potholes) in the prairie pothole region of 
southern Alberta and the north-centred United States. The customers whom Delta represents are 
contributors who intend to hunt these species during the southward migration. Higher nesting 
success is assumed to result from promoting specified nesting habitat.
Delta demonstrates its service to contributors (production of ducks) to a greater extent 
than did the Department of Agriculture in demonstrating conservation of soil. Instead of assum­
ing that the use of the land creates the desired product. Delta defines the existence of ducks by a 
direct measure. Surveys of duck production, though not an exact measurement, define the 
attribute directly. In fact. Delta uses this fact as a primary selling point for their program. The 
promotional brochure, "Adopt A Pothole and together w e can bring back the ducks" (Delta 
1993a), boasts, "Finally. A proven action program to fill the flyways" (emphasis in original). 
Whereas the basis for the proof could be debated by any scientist, the argument is that desired 
t results are being measured directly.
I The method of exchange is by reporting the results of surveys of waterfowl nests and
|  introducing landowners to contributors (Delta 1993b). Individuals who contribute to the pro-
t gram receive an aerial photograph of a wetland they have "adopted" and receive periodic reports
|  on the status o f waterfowl production on the prairies. These reports admit that "waterfowl
Si
|  surveying in not an exact science" (Delta 1993b), but list estimates of duckling production for a
$ given acreage. The Adopt-A-Pothole report describes the goals, background, implementation,
? budget, future plans, and data on costs and acres covered by contract A single-page report, the
\ Waterfowl Report, presents on the first side a verbal summary of recent events pertinent to the
| program. On the back side, tables list estimates of duckling production and totals of acres
|  included in the program. The Adopt-A-Pothole report is distributed semi-annually, and the
1 waterfowl report quarterly.
; As in the Conservation Reserve contract, the conservationist pays the landowner for the
\ right to direct the cultivation of land. Delta pays a higher rate to landowners whose land needs
replanting instead of simply letting existing vegetation grow. The managed attribute of land,
• cropland, is defined to the same extent as in Conservation Reserve: that approved vegetation is
established and maintained acceptably. At this level of definition. Delta distinguishes between 
land that must be planted and land only to be left undeveloped. A higher rental rate is offered for 
cropland seeded to grass ($ 3 0 /acre) than for native, existing grassland ($7/ acre). The higher rate 
is supposed to cover the cost of seeding, which makes sense, but what if a higher rate was paid 
for native grassland to create an incentive to protect it?
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The method and timing of completing the exchange are defined similarly to Conservation 
Reserve: site visits to determine compliance and 5-year contracts, 50% of annual payment by 1 
May, and the balance on 1 November.
Hunting Leases
Hunting leases are voluntarily agreements designed to capture the value of an even less 
tangible feature of land than is population viability (e.g, Delta, Defenders), soil stability (e.g., 
Conservation Reserve), or biodiversity (e.g.. Conservancy). In each of those previous cases, the 
customer wanted something that could conceivably be measured with the right equipment, skill, 
and money. In this case, the customer is after an enjoyable hunting experience: something of 
which only he or she can be the judge.
The consulting team of Crawford and Bourland arranges hunting leases. In these con­
tracts, the landowner sells experiences by selling the opportunity to have the experience. The 
opportunity is defined by access, management, and exclusion. A  hunter or a hunting club 
receives "all rights of ingress and egress to and from the Leased Premises" to the extent that the 
club members and their guests hunt and engage only in related activities and that they remain in 
the good graces of the property owner (the contract defines these points with extensive text).
The club also gets the right to manage the land to enhance w ildlife populations. Club 
members can plant food plants and install feeders "where appropriate" and, again, within 
hunting regulations.
Finally, the club can exclude other hunters — and only other hunters — from the prop­
erty. The "LESSOR, its employees, licensees, agents and contractors reserves and shall have the 
unrestricted right of ingress and egress from the LEASED PREMISES."
Endangered Species Leases
Endangered Species Leases have been agreed to in one case that I described. The Texas 
Parks and Wildlife Department has entered into leases with landowners as a means toward 
recovering the endangered Attwater's Prairie Chicken. These agreements give the state access to 
the property for "legitimate purposes" and to limit the number o f cows on the property. Other 
terms resemble those of the hunting lease.
A notable difference among these agreements is that som e identify directly the values of 
interest to the parties, and others do not. The number of cows on a tract may relate closely to the 
likelihood that prairie chickens will persist, or they may not. In Conservation Reserve, cover types 
probably relate very well to reduction in sediment. A hunting lease cannot spell out the quality of 
the experience, but by giving the hunters near-complete ownership of the land, they obtain a lot 
of control over the circumstances, which influence the quality of the experience. The same 
strategy applies to endangered species leases.
Cost-shares
When landowners and conservationists collaborate to restore a stream channel, as they 
have done several times in the Blackfoot Valley of western Montana, the agreement transpires in
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a relatively short time. In what is titled a "wildlife extension agreement," terms describe what the 
project will accomplish, how much money, equipment, and labor will be supplied by each party, 
and also what land management will occur after the project is complete.
These agreements rely on the collaboration of the landowner and conservationist to 
gather the labor and capital, and also to measure the results. The two plan and carry out the 
project together, allowing for constant exchange of ideas and negotiation of values. In the end, 
they know how w ell the project meets their interests because they had the chance throughout to 
direct it, and they have shared management rights to the property insofar as the project improves 
it.
Easement and Estate Management
Conservation easements are a popular and well-known means of reaching voluntary 
agreement with a landowner for conservation purposes. The easement contract is more complex 
than previous exam ples of agreements as it includes the landowner, a conservation group, and 
the federal government. Easements also are a common part of estate management strategies, 
which include several other examples of agreement The com plexity of these agreements arises in 
tax law.
An easem ent enables a conservationist to buy management rights to only those parts of a 
tract that directly influence the conservation value of the property. Those parts of the tract are 
described as the "ecological and esthetic features" and managing them typically means control- 
? ling the building o f homes or other buildings, and developing rangeland and timberland. The
1 Conservancy and smaller land trusts use easements often, perhaps because it is the best tool to
I protect assemblages, or communities, of living and non-living resources. The mission of the
|  Conservanaj is "to preserve plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity
|  of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive" (TNC : back cover). In a
i  word, the product o f the Conservanaj operations is biodiversity (i.e., variety in life forms and life
|  processes).
j  The parties joining the Conservancy in contracts are its supporters and the private owners
|  of land useful for maintaining or restoring biodiversity. Supporters is a general term encompass-
|  ing contributors to the Conservancy and government agencies who purchase land from the Conser-
f vanaj when it opts to buy property rather than obtain an easem ent from the original owner,
r The extent to which biodiversity and development rights are traded varies widely in the
I Conservancy transactions. Biodiversity in a particular transaction could be a single population or
| an area o f habitat. Development rights, ranging from specific modifications such as mowing to
• packages of rights, could be secured by promise, conservation easement, or fee-title purchase of
the land. Combinations of these three ways of controlling developm ent rights with various 
definitions of biodiversity generate many individual arrangements. Descriptions of these ar­
rangements are supplied to supporters in magazines and newsletters as evidence of biodiversity 
protection.
Estate management agreements do not all pertain directly to the conservation value of 
land, but they are marketed by land trusts as strategies that keep small private landowning
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families in possession of their rural land. "Cows not Condos!" is the rallying cry behind this idea, 
as one bumper sticker reads. There are a number of publications that describe these, including 
Preserving Family Lands (Small 1992) and Conservation Options: a landowner's guide (Alliance 
1993).
Franchise
I named this category myself because I could not find a name for it used by the people 
who have reached this kind of agreement. Professional conservationists, including one of my 
colleagues (Arha 1997), call them Private Land/Public Wildlife programs. The name is apt, and 
introduces some of the complexity, but it is, basically, a franchise agreement Franchise is the 
right to market a product or service, often exclusive for a specified area, as granted by a manufac­
turer or company. Consider state fish and wildlife agencies as manufacturers in the business of 
game wildlife. To hunt, a hunter must buy a right from the agency in the form o f a hunting tag. 
Franchise agreements enable a landowner to purchase the tag-selling operation from the agency 
under limitations. This is analogous to a restaurateur buying the menu, decor, name, logo, etc., 
from a national chain like Red Lobster and setting up a business of his or her own.
Private Management
Under some conditions and limitations, private landowners and other private persons 
; can receive rights to manage wildlife. In three examples I described, two involved private groups
i raising endangered wildlife in captivity, and one company that assumed management of a rare
5 fish found on company lands. The difference between Private Mangement and Franchise is
f  debatable; I distinguish the two because access and exclusion in Private Management are inciden-
tal to the intentional transfer of management rights. Also, the model of Private Management for
I-
I endangered species would not always have a retail opportunity. An agency could use this model
i  to contract with private landowners to do the same job an agency would do on public land. In
f this case. Private Management would be a private delivery of a public service, which differs from
« Franchise.
?
f%
|  Exemptions
I Exemptions are pseudo-voluntary agreements in which a regulation is relaxed in ex-
l: change for conservation practiced by the landowner. This is the jumping-off point from the old
| model of conservation to the new one. Regulation is the involuntary alternative to agreement.
| Habitat Conservation Plans, as described by endangered species regulations (50 CFR17.22(b)(l)),
\ can win for a landowner a permits for "incidental take" of a species when their otherwise lawful
i activity would result in a taking o f a threatened or endangered species. Another example is the
provision in the Endangered Species Act §10 for special rules covering the taking of animals 
returned to their historic range. These "non-essential/experimental" populations can be pro­
tected with regulations tailored to the species and the reintroduction situation. The North 
American wolves, the red and the grey, both have been reintroduced under these provisions. The 
grizzly bear is proposed for reintroduction with such a rule (USDI1997), and a number of less- 
controversial species have also been managed this way.
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The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service are the only legal 
entities with authority to intervene physically with endangered species or to grant permits for this 
authority. Most of the same manipulation of endangered animals conducted by Fish and Wildlife 
personnel in the course of recovering the species would constitute harm if executed by unautho­
rized people. This situation defines a right of access to endangered species. Personnel of the U. S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service Red Wolf Recovery Program used the Endangered Species Act to 
transfer this right of access, under limited conditions, to hunters and trappers in the area of a 
reintroduction project in coastal North Carolina.
When planning the second attempted mainland reintroduction of red wolves (eventually, 
it was the first successful attempt). Red Wolf Program personnel concentrated their efforts on 
engendering support for the project (Moore and Smith 1991, Schildwachter 1994). Their efforts 
identified access to traditional hunting and trapping lands by local citizens as an issue of major 
concern in the community. Requiring cooperation of local citizens and facing commitment to the 
American public as the customer of recovery efforts. Red Wolf Program personnel decided that 
permitting continued hunting and trapping in the area of the reintroduction was the best way to 
proceed with the project. Special, less-restrictive prohibitions on human activities in the project 
area were written under authority of the Endangered Species Act that forgave incidental harm to 
red wolves when the incident was reported (Parker and Phillips 1991).
The experimental status proscribed by the special regulations transferred from the Red 
Wolf Program to recreationists in the area the legal right to trap or shoot reintroduced red wolves 
accidentally. The attribute is access to the animals, defined to the extent that access is taken 
1 incidentally in the judgement of the Red Wolf Program, and is reported immediately. The ex-
l  change occurs upon the report of a hunter, trapper, or motorist who incidentally traps, injures or
h kills a red wolf.e
s
|  Miscellany: working together and voluntary compliance
|  Multi-party, or umbrella, groups seem to be rising in popularity. They are enough of a
jr
I presence that Sierra Club President Mike McCloskey has publicized his concern about them
|  (McCloskey 1996). Sometimes these work collaboratively, as the Black Bear Conservation Com-
i mittee has, to develop a restoration plan and work toward a common objective. Other cases, like
f Project SPIARE, work more cooperatively, finding opportunities to help one another. The variety
[ of purposes for which these groups form is so wide that a typology focused only on groups is
\ possible. The points about working together that are relevant to endangered species conservation
v by voluntary agreement are: groups create rules for agreement, groups distribute costs, and
groups struggle to decide who belongs.
Rules of Agreement
The most basic transaction, perhaps buying food, is defined by the currency, price tags, 
check-out counters, and receipts among other things. The agreement reached by a customer and 
a grocer when the customer brings a loaf of bread to the counter is so clearly defined that they 
need not speak. When they do speak, the talk is limited to polite exchange of good wishes. 
Compared with this example, an agreement on conserving wildlife has no rules at all. Wildlife on
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private land are not always visible, and the real element of interest, the chance the wildlife will 
persist, is invisible. There is no easy way to measure either the presence of w ildlife or the likeli­
hood it will persist, and there are no standard times or places to pay a landowner for promoting 
it. This lack of rules promotes a lot of talk. In Chapter 4 ,1 describe this talk in detail; for now, my 
point is only that groups "working together" talk to establish rules of agreement.
Distributing Cost
In Maine, the members of Project SHARE discovered that several of them had valuable 
parts to a conservation project and, working together, could piece them together. In the case of 
building a fish ladder where an impassible dam stood, one member knew a cement-contractor, 
another member had the design for the ladder, the group raised money for concrete and wood, 
and another member had volunteers who could build i t  Together, they put together the equip­
ment, supplies, labor, and expertise and shared the cost.
Deciding Who Belongs
Deciding who belongs is what distinguishes collaboration from consensus in the mind of 
Matt McKinney, director of the Montana Consensus Council. He told me in person, and has 
published, his v iew  that unless everyone with an interest in the discussion is involved, you are 
collaborating. When all interested parties are present and they agree, then you have consensus. 
The people I spoke to who work in groups noted that some people are "extreme" and will attend 
meetings only to prevent agreem ent To proceed, these people may need to be denied member- 
\ ship in the agreement group.
i Factors in the Typology
|  The main types of agreement just described are distinguished by their prominent fea-
|  tures: a handshake agreement without legal bond, a payment for damage not legally required, a
|  donation of development rights, and so on. Details for each type, however, more fully describe
T the structure of these agreements and the possibilities for combining and interchanging their
I parts to create new  agreements. Clues to these details are the brokering role played by the
i- conservation interest in each type, and the differences between what is sought after and what is
|  paid for, and som e other elements. Economic scholarship has proposed som e description and
: explanation for these clues and I apply that work here. On the basis of transaction-cost econom-
1 ics, I have described agreements in terms of Complexity of O wnership, Types o f Ownership,
s and Elements o f  Exchange.
The basis of this comparative analysis is transaction-cost economics, which compares the 
ways exchanges are arranged according to the cost of establishing and protecting property rights. 
Theoretically, people will always settle on the transactions of least cost. Typically, a transaction 
cost analysis will compare the size of transaction costs among several alternative arrangements of 
the same transaction. That analysis could follow mine; here, I stopped at defining the alternative 
arrangements already used by which landowners agree to perform som e unprofitable act of 
conservation for the public.
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Schlager and Ostxom (1992) described how levels of ownership rights compose complete 
ownership and these can be divided and separated. Allen (1991) described the elements of 
transactions, and Cheung (1970) distinguished between de facto and de jure rights of ownership. 
Combining these concepts, I have drawn the structure of Market Conservation. I also looked for 
the meaning of Market Conservation and found that it is centrally about interests in land and that 
in the cases I examined closely, a process for reaching agreement was evident. This process leads 
from the first contact between a conservationist and a landowner to the completion of a deal and 
living with it.
Complexity of Ownership
Lueck (1995) show ed that ownership of wildlife mixes ownership of land, a private good, 
with ownership of wildlife, a mainly public good, to produce situations more complex than the 
simple private-land/public-wildlife dichotomy. Many cases of local, voluntary, and informal 
agreement are documented for ocean fisheries. On land, an extra element of complexity is added  
by Iandownership.
1
1
ri
iII
I
ii
{ Access: the right to enter a defined physical property. I modified this definition so access to
| non-land properties could be coded. For example, a hunter buys from a state agency the
j right to "access" a deer by killing it and taking it home, or, as it often is described in
I regulations, "reducing it to possession." In order to hunt, the hunter also needs access to
t gamelands. This distinction is elaborated below.
? Withdrawal: The right to obtain the "products" of a resource (e.g., catch fish, appropriate
\ water, etc.). Schlager and Ostrom (1992), writing about fisheries classified fish as a
| product of the area of water defined as the fishery. I have separated the fish as a separate
! good.
Management: The rights to (1) regulate internal use patterns and (2) improve the resource 
(or otherwise change it).
Exclusion: The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be 
transferred.
Alienation: The right to sell or lease either Management or Exclusion rights.
Types of Ownership
Ownership often is associated with the word "interest" One definition of "interest" is, 
"A right or claim to something." This word figures prominently in what people say about 
agreement, as I will describe more fully in the next section. If an interest is a right or claim to 
something, then full interest should be complete right or claim. A hunter has some right to game 
wildlife, but the wildlife, w e say, is publicly owned. The holder of a conservation easement has 
claim to access and development rights on another person's land. There should be a way to 
describe stages of ownership leading from none to full. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) proposed 
such a scheme, railing  full owners "owner", and lesser owners proprietors, managers, and users, 
in descending order (Table 3).
The rights entailed by ownership categories are as follows.
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This explains how the hunter claims ownership of wildlife, and how the easement holder 
claims ownership of development rights; later, I will apply it to all the cases. A  person becomes a 
hunter (in the legal sense) when he or she buys a hunting license. This license is a limited prop­
erty right to chase, kill, and take home game wildlife. Embodied in the license are the regulations 
that define which wildlife are game, which individuals can be taken, what equipment and 
techniques may be used in the hunt The license gives the hunter the right of "access and with­
drawal" to wildlife. Most conservation easements also convey access and withdrawal rights, but 
their purpose is to transfer the right of changing the property to someone who will not exercise 
that right. Armed with this right to "regulate internal use patterns," the holder of the easement is 
a manager.
i
Table 3. Ownership categories defined by levels of ownership rights (Schlager 
and Ostrom 1992).
Owner Proprietor Manager User
Access X X X X
and withdrawal
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
|  Elements of Exchange
|  In transferring different ownership rights, agreements often are very specific about such
I questions as who, what, where, when, and how these rights are transferred. There should be, and
fj is, a scheme describing these also. Allen (1991:14) proposed that "every contract implicitly or
t  explicitly defines the attributes traded, the extent, timing, and form of measurement, and the
residual claimants." These components of each exchange are defined as follows:
I Parties: the parties involved in a voluntary transaction who bear the costs and gain the
; profits from exchange; in economic terms, the residual claimants.
I Good: any tradable personal property, service, or other useful thing.
I
Attribute: the feature of a good that is measured in a transaction; for example, land can be 
used for a hunting opportunity and for many overlapping purposes as well. Land 
supports livestock, wildlife, and hunting experiences. Ranchers do not suspend their 
ranching operation during the hunting season, but, above a certain stocking of cattle, the 
land would become unsuitable for most hunters. Recovery of endangered species is 
another purpose to which land can be dedicated, and also one that does not necessarily
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conflict with simultaneous uses of land. Because land carries many non-rival attributes, a 
particular tract conceivably couid be a ranch, a hunting area, and a part of a recover}' 
program simultaneously.
Extent: the degree to which the attribute is measured. A landowner sells a hunter access to 
gam e lands. Access can be defined as showing up (e.g., parking within sight of the 
landowner's house, or checking in and out of the property at the landowner's house, or 
etc.); or spending a measured amount of time on the property (e.g., checking in and out 
before 12 noon to qualify for the half-day price); or killing a certain type of animal while 
on the property.
Method: the means of measuring the attribute. This is often related to the extent, but differs 
in that this is what is done, not what is sought Weighing by scale is a common method of 
determining value. In wildlife conservation, measuring value for a particular attribute 
might mean determining the presence of an animal in an area (e.g., using scent stations, 
railing and visual surveys, etc.). Furthermore, habitat-quality could be evaluated by 
measuring quantities of food, water, shelter, and space either by ground survey or by 
analysis of photographic images of the land surface taken from airplane or satellite. 
Population parameters can be estimated by harvesting, trap-and-release, and radio 
telemetry.
Timing: the order of measurement, delivery, and paym ent
Combining these three ideas — levels of ownership, complexify of ownership, and 
elements of transactions — I created a coding scheme to describe voluntary agreements. These 
descriptions, and the typology can be used to (1) classify cases for later study of transaction cost, 
ease, conservation effectiveness, etc., and (2) prompt creativity in devising new  agreements by 
using the typology as a heuristic device.
|  Defining Attributes and Extents
|  In any taxonomic exercise — that is, assigning objects to categories— there is bound to be
|  disagreement. Attributes and extents caused me the greatest difficulty, so I will clarify these
I elements here. Both elements define how closely a deal reflects the interest of the traders. The
f
|  attribute is the part of the good that is measured, and the extent is the degree to which the at-
t tribute is measured.£
{ The attributes in these agreements almost never exactly match the interest of the traders.
| For example. Delta Waterfowl Foundation is interested in waterfowl populations, but in their
I contract they measure habitat. If Delta could afford to measure waterfowl populations, then they
j could choose an attribute that matches their interest.
j The extent is the degree to which the attribute is measured. By measuring habitat, Delta
checks whether or not grasses are growing. To be more specific, they could require that certain 
kinds of grasses grow in certain amounts on each acre.
Economic Details of Agreement
Most people who reached agreement in these cases traded attributes of land and wildlife 
species, though some dealt in water rights and even genes. The following sections elaborate on 
the main types of agreement and their details. Each section contains one case-table for each
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agreement, depicting Ownership Categories (as per Table 3, p. 59), and Elements of Exchange (as 
per p. 59). The case-tables comprise a Schematic of Ownership and a Report of the Elements of 
Exchange.
Schematic of Ownership
The first part o f each case-table shows which levels of ownership are transferred from 
whom to whom. For example, a Registry Agreement (Table 5) transfers three levels from the 
landowner to the conservationist (Table 4).
Table 4. Example Schematic of Ownership, the case of a Registry Agreement.
LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/W ithdrawal X X
M anagem ent X — X
Exclusion X ^  X
Alienation X
Report of Elements of Exchange
The next part of each case-table reports the elements of the exchange. The elements 
' appear as 4 narrative descriptions, one for each level of ownership. The narrative following each
|  ownership heading identifies in boldface (continuing with the example of a Registry Agreement
I (Table 6)):
j- (1) The parties, the rights transferred, and good involved, e.g., "Landowner
transfers Access and W ithdrawal rights over Land to Conservationist"
I
|  (2) The attribute and extent, e.g., "For the attribute of ecological and esthetic
features and to the extent that the conservationist can inspect and study the ecological and 
I esthetic features"
(3) The method and timing of the exchange, e.g., "By patrol, must give notice
before arriving"
Patrol is the term I use to describe the most common method of measuring exchanges. 
This means a regular or repeated inspection of an area. Most agreements about land manage­
ment rely on patrols because, I suspect, most land management is visible and patrol is the cheap­
est way to ensure it is carried out. Another method of measuring is "collaboration." By working 
together on a project, the parties see all along how it develops and understand why it ends up the 
way it does.
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Registry
In form, the registry agreement matches the easement agreement (see Table 14, page 68). 
The difference is that registry agreements are not binding.
Registry agreements, like easements, specify features o f the land that are to be protected 
or managed. For example, a landowner who harbors a small patch of a rare plant w ould agree to 
mow, or not m ow, that patch depending on whether m owing helped it survive.
Table 5. A Registry Agreement, case of The Nature Conservancy
LAND Landowner
Access/W ithdrawal X —
M anagem ent X —
Exclusion X —
Alienation X
A ccess and  W ithdraw al: Landow ner transfers A ccess and W ithdrawal rights over Land to C onservation ist
For the attribu te  o f  ecological and esthetic features and to the extent tha t the conservationist can inspect and 
study th e  ecological and esthetic features 
B y  patrol, must give notice before arriving
M anagem ent Landow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onservationist
For the a ttribu te  o f  ecological and esthetic features and to the extent tha t the landowner follows the 
conservationist's instructions for managing these features 
B y  patrol during term of agreem ent
E xclusion: L andow ner transfers E xclusion rights over Land to C onservation ist
For the a ttribu te  o f  ecological and esthetic features and to the extent tha t management instructions may 
, entail restricting access.
B y  patrol during term of the agreement 
i  A lienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over Land
I Reward and Compensation
I When com pensating a landowner for his or her livestock killed by a predator, Defenders£
 ̂ of Wildlife is trading in rights to a species: either gray wolves grizzly bears. The trade involves
j !  only access and withdrawal rights because Defenders has focused their intent on the chance that
£ wolves occasionally kill livestock.
|  Defenders takes responsibility for livestock that are vulnerable to wolves to the extent
; that if a professional biologist determines that wolves killed the cow (or sheep, or whatever), they
< will pay the value of that animal. There is some disagreement between ranchers and Defenders
\ over the appropriate amount to pay: ranchers want the full future value. Defenders pays current
value.
Note the similarity between this compensation agreement and the purchase of a hunting 
license. A hunter buys rights to access game populations and withdraw a certain amount of 
individuals. The differences here begin with Defenders not having a legal property right to the 
livestock, nor a legal liability for the wolves.
When rewarding a landowner for harboring a successful den of grey wolves. Defenders 
engages a similar transaction. Defenders again assumes liability for wolves by paying a rental fee 
to landowners that harbor a successful den.
Conservationist 
►  X
X
^  X
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Table 6. Reward and Compensation Agreements, the case of Defenders of 
Wildlife. A. Compensation. B. Reward.
SPECIES Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X W  X
Management X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A. COMPENSATION
A ccess and Withdrawal: Landow ner transfers de facto A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over S pec ies  to C onserva­
tionist
For the attribu te  o f  predatory habits to the extent tha t wolves kill livestock 
B y  professional judgement while cause of death is identifiable
M anagem ent Landow ner holds de facto M anagem ent rights over S p ec ies  
Exclusion: Landowner holds de facto Exclusion rights over S pec ies  
Alienation: Landowner holds de facto Alienation rights over S pec ies
B. REWARD
A ccess and  Withdrawal: L andow ner transfers de facto A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over S pec ies  to C onserva­
tionist
For the attribute  o f  reproductive success and to the extent tha t a den succeeds, with pups surviving at 10
months of age
B y  site visit after 10 months
|  M anagem ent Landow ner holds de  facto M anagem ent rights over S pec ies
1
r Exclusion: Landowner holds de facto Exclusion rights over S pecies
I Alienation: Landowner holds de facto Alienation rights over S p ec ies
I
By requiring the den to produce pups. Defenders makes survival, or fitness the attribute of 
the species that is traded. Unfit wolves would lose for the landowner his or her reward payment, 
but the offer creates an incentive for the landowner to improve denning conditions.
Based on their knowledge of wolf life-history, Defenders declares the den successful when 
the pups are 10 months old.
Lease
Leases may be the most common form of agreement along with easements. Perhaps 
because they are common, they occur in wider variety. I present here one hunting lease and one 
lease for endangered species habitat.
When a hunting club leases private property (Table 7), it purchases near-complete 
ownership of the land. The limits on the club's ownership are in the rights they buy (all rights 
except alienation), and in the attributes and extents of those rights.
Access to the property, for example, is focused on the land's suitability for hunting. The 
hunters are there because it is as good a place to hunt as they can afford (probably) and they enter 
the property either to hunt or to improve the hunting quality by improving game habitat or some 
similar job. In the words of the lease, "LESSOR does hereby lease to and let unto LESSEE, for the 
rentals and term, and subject to the reservations and conditions hereinafter set forth, the exclusive
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Table 7. A Lease, the case of Crawford and Bourland Consulting Foresters
LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X ^  X
Management X >  X
Exclusion X >  X
Alienation X
A ccess an d  W ithdrawal: Landowner transfers A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over Land to C onservation ist (i.e.. a 
hunting club)
For the attribu te o f  gamelands and to the extent tha t the club is doing hunting-relating things while on the 
property and obeying all restrictions such as  camping in approved places and driving only on approved roads 
B y patrol during the term of the agreement
M anagem ent Landow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onservationist (i.e.. a  hunting club)
For the attribu te  o f  gamelands and to the extent tha t the club can plant food plots and install feeders where 
appropriate and approved by landowner 
B y  patrol during term of agreement
Exclusion: L andow ner transfers Exclusion rights over Land to C onservation ist (i.e., a hunting club)
For the attribu te o f  gamelands and to the extent tha t the club can post and patrol the grounds to keep out 
other hunters only, and must have all signs approved by landowner, and the club cannot erect fences 
B y  patrol during the term of the agreement 
Alienation: Landow ner holds Alienation rights over Land
right and privilege to hunt, pursue, capture, shoot, kill, and take away all legal types and species 
of game birds and game animals..."
The extent of the hunters' access is specified as" the purpose of conducting hunting 
3 activities upon the.Leased Premises, but does not include any other activities, including by way of
|  illustration but not limited to, commercial recreational developments or facilities, commercial
y camping activities, commercial fishing rights, non-hunting and fishing related vehicular activities,
I grazing rights, agricultural rights, or any rights to timber upon or mineral in or under said lands."
|  There is similar language throughout the lease to describe the extent to which manage-
i  ment rights are transferred for planting food plots, and how the hunting club can exclude other
|  users from the property.
1 Compared to that elaborate wording, the Texas Parks and W ildlife lease (Table 8) is
. simple. Here, the state of Texas leases access and management rights from landowners for the
|  purpose o f improving habitat for endangered Attwater's prairie chicken (Tympanuchus atpido
I attwateri).
I Table 8. A Lease, the case of Texas Parks and Wildlife
j: LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X W  X
j Management X W  X
• Exclusion X
i Alienation X
A ccess and  W ithdrawal: Landowner transfers A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over Land to S tate  A gency
For the attribu te o fn la  and to the extent that the S ta te  A gency is is on the property for a ‘legitimate purpose’ 
B y  patrol, with a lump sum payment when lease is signed.
M anagem ent L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to S ta te  Agency
For the attribu te  o f  cattle capacity and to the extent tha t initial stocking can be 90 cows/acre and not to 
exceed 70 thereafter 
B y  patrol, over the term of the agreement 
Exclusion: Landow ner holds Exclusion rights over Land 
Alienation: L andow ner holds Alienation rights over Land
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The Texans manage the use of the "grazing attribute" of the land: call the grazing 
attribute the capacity of cattle that can survive there. By managing this, Texas Parks and W ildlife 
can alter the condition of the range, which is part of the habitat value for prairie chickens.
A little closer to the point, the Delta Waterfowl Foundation lease (Table 9) is based 
directly on the "grass attribute" of land. Rather than contracting for the number of cow s that are 
eating grass, Delta contracts for the presence of grass and leaves it to the landowner to decided  
whether to establish the grass by protecting it (i.e., not m owing it) or by planting it. Delta sim ply  
checks to be sure it is there for ducks to nest in.
The difference in the leases of Delta and Texas Parks and Wildlife is in measuring the 
exact feature of land needed for conservation or measuring a surrogate. Another exam ple of 
contracting for a surrogate measure is the USDA Conservation Reserve Program (Table 10). In a 
CRP contract, the Department of Agriculture wants to pay landowners to stabilize their soil; in 
effect, USDA buys the stability of soil. To do this, however, they measure the "grass attribute" of 
land just as Delta does.
Think o f this trade-off as "what-you-get vs. what-you-pay-for." A version of this trade­
off faces conservationists who lease water. The objective of Oregon Water Trust (Table 11) and 
Environmental D efense Fund (Table 12) is to ensure the quality o f fish habitat. These groups 
manage an irrigator's withdrawal of water from a stream based on whether the irrigator fallows 
his or her land. Just as managers of waterfowl, prairie chickens, and soil need grass or trees to 
accomplish their goal, managers of fish need water. The hunting club (Table 7) in the first ex­
ample of a lease solved the problem of what-you-get vs. what-you-pay-for by contracting for 
more ownership. They made the purpose of the contract explicit to the hunting rights, but 
without a w ay to measure the quality of hunting rights, they arranged a contract that allowed  
them to control more elements of the land that make or break the hunting experience.
Table 9. A Lease, the case of Delta Waterfowl Foundation
LAND Landowner C onservationist
Access/Withdrawal X >  X
M anagement X >  X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
I  A ccess an d  W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers A ccess and  W ithdrawal rights over Land to C onservation ist
f For the attriubute of n/a and to the extent that the conservationist can inspect the property
I  B y  patrol, during term of the agreement
? M anagem ent L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onservation ist
I  For the a ttribu te  o f  capacity of land to grow vegetation and to the extent that the landowner establishes or
j  maintains a cover crop
i B y  site visit (2 per year): during the term of the contract; monthly payments
Exclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over Land 
Alienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over Land
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Table 10. A Lease, the case of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
Reserve Program
LAND Landowner
Access/Withdrawal X —
M anagem ent X —
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess an d  Withdrawal: Landowner transfers A ccess and  Withdrawal rights over Land to C onservation ist 
For the a ttribu te  o f  n/a and to the extent tha t Conservationist can inspect the property 
B y  patrol during term of the agreem ent
M anagem ent Landow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onservation ist
For the attribu te  o f capacity of land to grow vegetation and to the extent tha t the landowner establishes or 
maintains a cover crop
B y  site visit (2 per yr) during term of agreement 
Exclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over Land
Alienation: Landow ner holds A lienation rights over Land
Conservationist 
>• X 
► X
Table 11. A Lease, the case of Oregon Water Trust
WATER Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X ^  X
M anagement X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess an d  Withdrawal: Landowner transfers W ithdrawal rights over w ater to C onservation ist
For the attribu te  o f quantity and to the extent tha t the landowner fallows his o r her land and improves 
irrigation efficiency.
B y  patrol over a 1-2 year renewable term 
M anagem ent Landow ner holds M anagem ent rights over water 
Exclusion: S tate  Agency holds Exclusion rights over water 
Alienation: L andow ner holds Alienation rights over water
Table 12. A Lease, the case of Environmental Defense Fund
WATER Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X >  X
M anagement X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess an d  Withdrawal: Landowner transfers W ithdrawal rights over water to C onservation ist
For the attribu te o f  quantity (less than or equal to 16.000 acre-feet/yr) and to the extent tha t the landowner 
fallows land.
B y  patrol.
M anagem ent Landow ner holds M anagem ent rights over water 
Exclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over water 
Alienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over water
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Cost-share
Cost-shares focus on projects: work with an obvious goal, beginning, and end. In the 
USFWS Partners for W ildlife Program (Table 13), these projects typically are stream restorations, 
water diversions, and fencing. A landowner and conservationist could apply this arrangement 
to a previous type, such as cost sharing on a hunting lease to plant food plots, but Partners Pro­
gram cost-shares differ from these by focusing the contract directly on the wildlife habitat at­
tribute of land, which, like hunting quality, is hard to measure.
A cost-share could focus on a feature of land like buddings, and be defined as a contract 
on the suitability of land for construction. However, the language of a Partners Program contract 
says, "The wildlife cooperators ((i.e„ landowners and other parties)) in signing this agreement 
join as participants in a wildlife management program and grant to the FWS the authority to 
complete wildlife habitat development, or to personally carry out wildlife management activities 
with financial or material support, as described in the attached special provisions."
Calling the parties to the agreement "cooperators" highlights this strategy for trading an 
intangible value like wildlife habitat The cost-share strategy is — more than sharing just cost — 
sharing the work and the evaluation of the outcome as it develops. Handling the immeasurable 
value this w ay is flexible: not only is the work evaluated continually throughout the project by all
Table 13. A Cost-share, the case of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Partners for 
| Wildlife Program
V _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
LAND Landowner
Access/Withdrawal X —
M anagement X —
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess and W ithdrawal: Landow ner transfers A ccess and W ithdrawal rights over Land to Federal Agency 
For the attribute o f  n/a and to the extent that Agency staff are there at 'reasonable tim es'
B y  patrol, for the term of the agreem ent
M anagem ent Landow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to Federal Agency
For the attribu te  o f  wildlife habitat, and to the extent that a  specific development is completed and agricultural 
|  use is negotiated
Si B y  collaboration
, Exclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over Land
] A lienation: L andow ner holds Alienation rights over Land
i
i
cooperators, but other elements of the exchange are negotiated specifically. The boiler-plate 
; language to the agreement prohibits "any agricultural use of the tract such as livestock grazing or
haying, unless included as part of this or an amended agreement." The special provisions of 
Partners Program agreements in Montana include a standard amendment that states, "Haying,
grazing, and livestock watering will be permitted on the area covered by this agreement." These
specific exemptions change the extent to which management rights are conveyed from the 
landowner to government conservationists.
Conservationist
X
^  X
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Easement
A Partners Program agreement is used to develop a project that will enhance wildlife 
habitat values, but an easement is used typically to prevent a development that will impair 
habitat values. The Nature Conservancy and the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation are well- 
known in the West for their conservation easements (Table 14).
Easements focus on the "ecological and aesthetic features and values" o f land. These 
attributes can be defined in the easement either directly or by an activity that affects them. For 
example, when a rare plant is one of the features protected by an easement, it is defined by its 
presence or absence. When the habitat value for a wildlife species, such as elk, is of interest, it is 
defined by guidance on how trees and forage should be managed to maximize habitat values.
Notice the extents to which easement attributes are defined (directly or by association) 
resemble the way attributes were defined in other cases. Texas Parks and W ildlife defined prairie 
chicken habitat value to the extent that regulating cattle grazing could affect it. The Partners
Table 14. An Easement, the case  of The Nature Conservancy
LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X — X
Management X X
Exclusion X — X
Alienation X
A ccess and  Withdrawal: Landowner transfers A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over Land to C onserva tion ist 
For the attribute o f  n/a and to the extent tha t enforce rights, study 
B y  patrol, notice required before visiting
M anagem ent Landowner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onservationist
For the attribute  o f  ecological and esthetic features and to the extent that the conservationist can restore 
these features and enjoin rival uses 
B y  patrol, during term of the agreement
Exclusion: Landow ner transfers Exclusion rights over Land to C onservationist 
For the attribute o f  n/a and to the extent tha t fencing 
B y  patrol, during term of the agreem ent
Alienation: Landow ner holds Alienation rights over Land
Program defined wildlife habitat values to the extent that they and their cooperators could fashion 
a project that, in their judgement, enhanced those values.
Easements, like hunting leases, involve more complete ownership rights. The conserva­
tionist earns proprietary rights over a limited interest. The reason for the similarity probably is 
the similarity in the conservationists' interests. The hunters are after an intangible, subjective goal 
of hunting experience. The Conservancy and the Elk Foundation are after biodiversity and high 
habitat values for elk and other wildlife. Both of these goals are complex and, practically speak­
ing, immeasurable. To arrange a deal to secure these interest, these conservationists, as the hunt 
club, arranged a deal earning them more extensive ownership.
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Franchise
Franchise is another type where proprietary ownership is traded, but the arrangement is 
more complex. Colorado's Ranching for W ildlife Program, for example, involves two transac­
tions and three main parties (Table 15).
Recall the concept of the franchise in the restaurant business: the owner of a local restau­
rant buys the rights to a national menu and agrees to run his or her local franchise according to 
certain guidelines.
In Ranching for Wildlife, landowners buy allotments of hunting tags (i.e., limited prop­
erty rights to wildlife) and agrees to manage his or her property according to Colorado Division 
of Wildlife direction. The landowner also agrees to admit a certain number of public hunters to 
his or her land, and then he or she sells the hunting tags to paying hunters.
Table 15. A Franchise, the case of Colorado Division of Wildlife, Ranching for 
Wildilfe Program. A. The land-rights in Franchise; B. The species-rights 
in Franchise.
A. The Land-rights in Franchise
LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/W ithdrawal X ^  X
M anagem ent X W  X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
t
J A ccess an d  W ithdraw al: L andow ner transfers A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over Land to S ta te  A gency
j For the attribu te  o f  gam elands and to the extent tha t landowner has these rights during the hunting season
I
B y  sign-up
) M anagem ent L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to S ta te  Agency
For the attribu te  o f  ecological features and to the extent tha t the State approves the landowner's m anage­
m ent plan
B y  professional review and site visit before agreem ent is settled.
Exclusion: L andow ner holds E xclusion  rights over Land
Alienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over Land
B. The Species-rights in Franchise
SPECIES Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X — — X
Management X
Exclusion X — X
Alienation X X
A ccess and  W ithdraw al: S ta te  A gency transfers A ccess and  W ithdrawal rights over S pecies to Landow ner
For the a ttribu te  o f  gam e and to the extent tha t the landowner uses legal weapons, hunts during the season, 
and follows other hunting regulations.
B y  patrol during the season , but tags are transferred before the season  
M anagem ent S ta te  A gency holds M anagem ent rights over S pec ies  
Exclusion: S ta te  A gency transfers Exclusion rights over S pecies to L andow ner
For the attribu te  o f  gam e and to the extent tha t the landowner determines who has access to his or her 
property
B y  patrol, during the term of the agreement 
Alienation: S ta te  A gency transfers A lienation rights over S p ec ies  to L andow ner
For the attribu te  o f  gam e and to the extent tha t the landowner can sell tags to other people.
B y  patrol, tags transferred before the hunt
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 0
One transaction is based on attributes of land: a landowner submits a management plan 
for approval and opens his or her land to som e degree of public hunting. This gives the state 
conservationists proprietary rights to private land.
The other transaction involves game wildlife as the traded good (Table 15). Here, land­
owners receive near-complete ownership of the wildlife, earning rights to hunt and kill, decide 
who else can hunt and kill, and choose to transfer these rights to other people. The landowner's 
ownership of wildlife is limited in kind and extent He or she has all levels of ownership except 
management; that is, the landowner cannot add individuals to the population or do anything else 
to the population beyond hunting i t  Their ownership is limited also by extent the hunting tags 
they buy that give them these rights are good only for the present hunting season.
Private Management
D eseret Land and Livestock and the Peregrine Fund (Table 16) are two examples of 
agreements between private landowners and conservation agencies by which the landowner is 
given the right to manage wildlife.
In the first case, Deseret harbored Bear River Bonneville Cutthroat trout on its property 
and was approached by the Utah Division of Wildlife with the following offer. If Deseret would 
restore streams and develop ponds such that the trout would have adequate habitat, and would
Table 16. Private Management, A. the case of Deseret Land and Livestock; B. 
the case  of the Peregrine Fund
SPECIES Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X X
Management X X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A. D eseret Land and Livestock
A ccess an d  W ithdrawal: State Agency transfers A ccess and  W ithdrawal rights over Species to L andow ner
For the attribu te  o f  n/a game and to the extent that landowner can allow catch-and-release fishing for the 
species
B y  patrol, during the term of the agreem ent 
M anagem en t L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to S tate Agency
For the attribu te  offish habitat and to the extent tha t landowner restores habitat to satisfaction of agency 
B y  project before trade of other rights 
E xclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over Species 
A lienation: S ta te  A gency holds Alienation rights over Species
B. Peregrine Fund
A ccess a n d  W ithdrawal: Federal Agency transfers A ccess and  W ithdrawal rights over Species to C onservationist 
For the attribu te  o f  n/a and to the extent tha t the conservationist may hold species in capitivity to rear and 
then release individuals 
B y  patrol over the term of the agreem ent
M anagem en t Federal Agency transfers M anagem ent rights over S pec ies  to C onservationist
For the attribu te  o f survivability and to the extent that the conservationists can reintroduce individuals to 
depleted or extirpated populations.
B y  collaboration on specific projects.
E xclusion: Federal Agency holds Exclusion rights over Species 
A lienation: Federal Agency holds Alienation rights over Species
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allow Utah to draw fish from these ponds tc use as a stocking source, then Utah would permit 
Deseret to run a commercial catch-and-release fishing business with these rare trout.
By accepting this arrangement, Deseret received access rights to trout to the extent that 
their customers could catch and release them. Deseret gave up some rights to manage its land by 
following the state's instructions to improve fish habitat. Utah retained rights to manage the fish 
by removing or introducing individuals. Note that Deseret has and retains exclusion rights to the 
fish by default because they own the land where the fish is found.
In the second case, the Peregrine Fund is permitted by the federal government to access 
endangered birds of prey to the extent that the Fund can hold them captive to rear and release 
them back to the wild. The Fund has the right to manage the wildlife in that they feed, house, 
and otherwise care for internal functions of the animal population. The rights of access and 
exclusion held by the Fund are defined by the necessity of allowing it to manage the birds.
Exemption
Experimental Populations and No-take Agreements (Table 17) are examples o f how the 
federal government has reached voluntary agreements with private people and landowners 
within the regulations on endangered species managem ent I recognize that this is not exactly a 
voluntary arrangement given the regulatory nature of the Endangered Species Act, but I include 
it as an example of a useful concept
When the red w olf (Canis nifiis) was proposed for reintroduction in North Carolina, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service used a provision of the law to write special regulations that would  
1 apply only to the red wolves they released into the wild. These rules allowed trappers and
• i  hunters to kill an endangered red wolf by accident. In effect, they transferred access and with­
drawal rights to red wolves to the extent that the withdrawal was accidental and that the hunter 
I or trapper reported the accident within 24 hours.
; A more complex version of the same idea is the No-Take Agreement, which is transferred
s through a memorandum (Table 18). Here as with an Experimental population, the landowner
|  receives the right of access and withdrawal of the endangered species. They receive this right in
j exchange for the management rights they transfer to the government in the form of an approved
I management plan the landowner agrees to follow.
5 
*
s6   ___________
|  Table 17. An Exemption, the case of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Red
Wolf Recovery Program
SPECIES Landowner
Access/Withdrawal X
Management 
Exclusion 
Alienation
A ccess and  W ithdrawal: Federal Agency transfers A ccess an d  W ithdrawal rights over Species to trappers
For the attribu te  o f  vulnerability to traps and to the extent tha t a  trapper accidentally captures a red wolf 
By  professional determination within 24 hours of the accidental capture 
M anagem ent: Federal Agency holds M anagem ent rights over Species 
Exclusion: Federal Agency holds Exclusion rights over S pec ies  
Alienation: Federal Agency holds Alienation rights over S pec ies
Consorvatiomst 
_ ,  X 
X 
X 
X
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Table 18. An Exemption, the case of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sen/ice Memo­
randa: A. Land-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency; B. De facto 
Species-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency; C. Species-rights from 
Federal Agency to Landowner
A. Land-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency
LAND Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X »  X
M anagem ent X W  X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess and  W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers A ccess and W ithdrawal rights over Land to Federal Agency
For the attribu te  o f  n/a and to the extent that agency people enter the property to handle, monitor, install 
equipment, exercise management rights, and other pertinent activity 
B y  patrol during term of agreement
M anagem ent L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to Federal Agency
For the attribu te  o f  capacity to support a chosen wildife population(s) and to the extent that the landowner 
follows an approved management plan
B y  cooperation and patrol, with a review after five years to update the management plan with new law and science. 
Exclusion: L andow ner holds Exclusion rights over Land 
Alienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over Land
B. De facto Species-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency
SPECIES Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X ^  X
M anagem ent X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess and  W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers A ccess and Withdrawal rights over Species to Federal A gency
For the attribu te  o f  n/a and to the extent tfiatthe landowner grants the agency access to his or her land when 
in the com pany of the Landowner or his or her employee 
B y  patrol, during term of the agreement 
M anagem ent: L andow ner holds whatever de facto Management rights over S pec ies  he o r she has 
\  Exclusion: L andow ner holds whatever de facto Exclusion rights over S p ec ie s  he o r  she  has
* Alienation: L andow ner holds whatever de facto Alienation rights over S p ec ies  he  o r  sh e  has
I
C. Species-rights from Federal Agency to Landowner
SPECIES Landowner Conservationist
Access/Withdrawal X x
Management X
Exclusion X
Alienation X
A ccess and  W ithdraw al: Federal Agency transfers A ccess and  W ithdrawal rights over Species to L andow ner 
For the attribu te  o f  vulnerability to land management to the extent tha t management modifies habitat or 
disrupts behavior of individuals of the species 
B y  patrol during term of agreement 
M anagem ent: Federal A gency holds M anagem ent rights over Species 
Exclusion: Federal Agency holds Exclusion rights over Species 
A lienation: F ederal A gency holds A lienation rights over Species
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The No-take Agreement highlights a difficulty that has shown up in court: is there a 
difference between management rights to land and access/ withdrawal rights to wildlife? Manag­
ing land affects the habitat value of that land for wildlife, so certain management could destroy 
the habitat value and, in effect, kill the wildlife. The No-take Agreement separates these rights by 
an agreement on safe management. If the landowner manages safely, then the only infringement 
on rights to the species are agreed to be accidental.
Working Together and Voluntary Compliance: the miscellany
These two types of agreement represent the fringes of my typology. There were a num­
ber of cases that I could not place in the preceding types, so I review them here (Table 19).
In several cases, voluntary agreements of various types (as described above) were 
arranged within the efforts of a larger group. Parties outside the agreement were aware of the 
agreement and were indirectly responsible for it because they shared membership with the 
parties in a larger group. For example, many cost-share agreements under the Fish and Wildlife 
Service Partners for Wildlife Program were arranged in the Blackfoot Valley of Montana where 
all such activities are coordinated by an umbrella group of citizens and private and government 
conservationists called the Blackfoot Challenge. It may be that the environment created by the 
Blackfoot Challenge made the cost-share agreements easier.
i Table 19. Working Together: the miscellany. A. the case  of the Black Bear
I Conservation Committee; B. The Blackfoot Challenge; C. Project SHARE
A. Black Bear Conservation Committee
A ccess and  W ithdraw al: Federal Agency holds A ccess  and Withdrawal rights over Species 
M anagem ent: F ederal Agency transfers M anagem ent rights over S pecies to group
For the a ttribu te  o f  persistence and to the extent that the agency institutes the group's plan 
B y  professional review and publication after the group develops the plan 
Exclusion: Federal A gency holds Exclusion rights over Species 
|  Alienation: Federal A gency holds Alienation rights over Species
f
|  B. Blackfoot Challenge
'!5.
C. Project SHARE (Salmon Habitat and River Enhancement)
•j A ccess and  W ithdrawal: S ta te  A gency transfers A ccess  and Withdrawal rights over S pec ies  to L andow ner
J For the a ttribu te  o f  reproductive success and to the extent that landowner produces fish for stocking
B y  collaboration, inspection
M anagem ent S ta te  A gency transfers M anagem ent rights over Species to L andow ner 
For the a ttr ibu te  o f  reproduction and to the extent that captive fish released 
By  collaboration, inspection 
Exclusion: S tate  A gency  holds Exclusion rights over Species 
Alienation: S tate A gency  holds Alienation rights over Species
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 4
In other cases, such as the State of Montana Forestry Best Management Practices Program 
(BMP), a group collaborates on rules for land management with which members voluntarily 
comply. This is an interesting twist on the management-right scenarios for common-pool re­
sources described by Schlager and Ostrum (1993), but I do not know where it fits in my typology. 
The BMP group is deciding on rules that will protect some of the public-good values of land, 
which is similar to what the managers, proprietors, and owners do with a common-pool resource. 
Unlike these governors of common-pool resources, however, the BMP group cannot require 
private landowners to adopt the group's rules. This is done through law, but that is not a volun­
tary agreement.
Conclusion
These agreements are reached within the rules of Governmental Conservation, or outside 
the rules as in the case of non-legally binding agreements. To experiment further with these 
agreements w ill require the rules of Governmental Conservation to change, at least by granting 
experimental authority to local conservationists and landowners. This policy implication is 
similar to the one identified by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), who described the need to determine 
the local arrangements of coaster fishermen before prescribing policy for managing coastal 
fisheries. In that case, the local arrangements preceded the policy. In the case of endangered 
species management, the policy preceded the local arrangements. Success in managing endan­
gered species by local arrangements, then, depends in part on the our ability to foster these 
arrangements under an existing set of policies.
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f Dan Pletscher (Director of the Wildlife Biology Program at the University of Montana)
I and I were driving to Helena, MT, to a discussion about changing the Endangered Species A ct
I On the drive, Dan asked me to define conservation. I paraphrased a dictionary definition, "to
I protect natural resources from unnecessary loss or waste." Dan complained that I left out the idea
I
« of sustainability. Looking back, I see I left out negotiation also. Not only do my case studies
1 show negotiation as a big part of conservation, but Dan and I that day were going to a negotiation
I of sorts convened by two state legislators who were developing recommendations for changing
| the Endangered Species A ct In this final chapter I produce not only a more thoughtful definition
I for Dan, but also propose a theory of how conservation works.
rr
Conservation Redefined
The cases in my study showed me that conservation begins with people having an 
interest in resources. History shows that when resources fail to satisfy our interests, w e try to 
correct the condition of resources. First this was done mainly by brute force among market 
hunters, landowners, game dealers, and governments. After state and federal laws settled
75
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conservation into a fairly peaceful nation-wide effort of government agencies, the varying 
interests in resources grew in number and kind. N ow  government is hard pressed to resolve the 
differences. Voluntary agreements are local examples of individual conservationists and 
landowners to resolve these differences. When these negotiators agree, they act together to 
protect resources from waste and sustain them. Either on private land or at state, regional, and 
federal levels, conservationists reach agreements and act on them. Local conservation usually 
results in projects, Iarger-scale conservation usually leads to policies and administration of public 
resources. At any level, interests are negotiated and action taken.
Pulling it all together: conservation is any act that negotiates interests in resources to 
reduce waste and sustain desirable conditions.
Types of Negotiations
Negotiations of interest in resources take 4 forms (Fig. 4). One is the debate of public 
interests in the public domain. This is where state and federal policies are made for air, water, 
and public lands. Another is the debate o f public interests on private lands. This is where 
regulations are debated for private lands and also where landowners and conservationists reach 
| voluntary agreements. Third is the negotiation of private interests in public land. Local
* collaboration (e.g., Project SHARE) and citizen management (e.g., Grizzly Reintroduction (USDI
| 1997)) are exam ples of how this negotiation is becoming formalized.
|  Common to all three negotiations is the trade-off between national and local interests.
|  Stout (1996) described three ways that agencies negotiate their national or regional
'j responsibilities with local people. First, agencies respond to the "squeaky wheels," i.e., those
!3
I people who call in or visit the agency. Second, agencies systematically describe interests of local
; people with surveys or similar methods. Third, agencies convene task forces. Voluntary
| agreements and citizen management are additional tools. When an agency reaches agreement
• with a landowner, that agreement is intended to carry out the agency mandate just as an agency
1 decision. Likewise, when an agency shares its management authority with local people, the
; decision of the group serves the role of the agency decision.
Having looked in detail at agreements of groups (e.g., the Bull Trout Restoration Team
r
and Project SPLARE) and of one-on-one agreement (the interviews behind Chapter 4), and having 
seen the pyramid as a useful representation of both, I propose that a pyramid also represents the 
whole practice o f conservation.
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The Conservation Pyramid
One of the problems with conservation, is a shortage of local arrangements for carrying it 
out. Remember Leopold's (1942:295) complaint that conservation focuses on "bureaus, policies, 
laws, and programs" rather than "resources, products, and Iand-users"? (see pg. 31) Mangun and 
Man gun (1991) argued that because local government has claimed no obvious role in wildlife 
conservation, the state and federal bodies dominate. If conservation were described as a 
pyramid, it would be precarious, lacking a base. Perhaps the new model of conservation is such a 
pyramid with a strong base of voluntary agreements with landowners and state task forces.
Pyramids that describe agreement and collaboration (Fig. 3) build a larger pyramid that 
represents conservation (Fig. 5). Just as a biotic pyramid describes functions of the resources (Fig. 
3), a conservation pyramid describes how people arrange conservation. When any level of a 
pyramid is weak or missing, the overall pyramid — either resources or conservation — is 
unhealthy. Following this model, when w e see defects in the resources pyramid, we could look to 
the conservation pyramid to plan a solution.
In the future, conservation may work as follows. Local conservation is built by a 
pyramid-like succession of daily life starting with grapevines and relationships and finishing with 
agreements that local people put on the ground (Fig. 5). Regulations would remain a part of local 
conservation. Based on the best agreements and accomplishments of local people, state and 
regional people (e.g.. Project SHARE, Blackfoot Challenge, the Bull Trout Restoration Team) 
would coordinate efforts and reach agreement for practices to cover large areas of public and 
private land. Capping the effort would be national policies. These policies would be grounded in 
the negotiations that lead to reduced waste and sustained conditions in smaller places.
Making It Happen
For conservationists and landowners (or other people) who want to see if the 
conservation pyramid can be built, I recommend the following to cultivate the base of local 
conservation.
Recognize the Need to Negotiate
It is very difficult to argue that conservation morally trumps uses of resources that 
appear to imperil the resources, and it is also hard to define peril. People appeal to great 
philosophers, to God, and to utilitarian arguments that we should not foul our own nest, but
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people have many countering moral appeals of their ovvn. There are few practical rejoinders to a 
landowning family that wants to violate someone's concept of conservation to earn a short-term 
profit to send children to school or pay for medical treatment. Even conservationists disagree on 
what is right, usually over risks in managing wildlife. For example, conservationists working to 
save the California condor disagreed about the decision to begin a captive breeding program. In 
Florida, biologists disagreed on whether to introduce cougars from Texas to supplement the 
Florida panther population.
I suggest that conservationists and landowners develop an honest curiosity and concern 
for each other's interests. Both are concerned with what the land can produce, even if the 
landowner has only a small tract with a nice view'. The history o f Iand-use in an area, and the 
cultural importance of local resources products would be a good starting place for the 
conservationist. The landowner could seek out state or private conservationists to see what they 
are tracking on their natural heritage databases.
The most valuable skill in recognizing the need to negotiate may be listening, but there 
are a few  things to look for. Active listening (Rogers 1951) is a skill, and can be learned.
Members told me that much of what they hear in the Talking/Listening stage is venting, so the 
prospects for agreement may seem dim at first. More specifically, learn what landowners' 
schedules are, and do not drop in on them at inconvenient hours. Learn each other's business 
objectives and how business is going. Do not work on your ow n clock alone.
Become Part of Your Community
This is not advice only for conservationists, though they may have a harder time taking it. 
Conservation agencies move som e employees frequently, and em ployees sometimes cannot or 
will not put down roots in any of their periodic communities. Employers may need to change 
some aspects of their employee's jobs to overcome this problem. Landowners also need to 
consider this. Several members of a Montana community in my study described a neighboring 
community as "apathetic" because there was less "community spirit" and therefore was a hard 
place to spread agreements.
Becoming part o f a community takes time, and trust and credibility are earned. Finding 
and meeting the official and unofficial community leaders appears to be an essential first step. 
Members also said that chance encounters in grocery stores and helping neighbors with flat tires, 
loose cows, and other small random projects all help build a person's presence in a community. It 
may help conservationists to focus their time in areas small enough to allow them to spend time
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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with people. None of the members with whom I spoke had experience building a grapevine in 
apathetic communities.
Develop Offers
Chapter 3 provides examples and hopefully will spark innovations. It seems inevitable 
that offers will rely on surrogate attributes and general measures, but improvements in 
technology might open new opportunities. Consider starting with a "free sample" offer. This is 
any easy agreement that gives people experience working together to meet a conservation 
objective, however small it may be. Nest-boxes have been used as "free samples."
Before offering, be sure to know the details of the offer. Field conservationists should 
have as much decision-making authority as possible, to allow tailoring of deals without 
paperwork and referrals.
Be ready to refer landowners to other conservationists or other landowners if necessary. 
When referring people, arrange the meeting yourself and go along with the person you referred.
Learn to Reach Agreement to Conserve Wildlife on Private Land
f
5 My version of an agreement pyramid is only a good start local conservationists and
i
|  landowners should use it experimentally until they learn (or make) the rules for reaching
|  agreement in their ow n area. Talking and listening likely is the key. There is a lot of talking in
|  agreements to conserve endangered species and it takes a lot of time. All o f us can reach
|  agreement with a grocer on a sack of groceries with barely a word, and even tough negotiations
|  (like labor union agreements) seem to fit some schedule. Agreement seems to defy scheduling,
I which may mean that people getting involved in this type of conservation need a flexible concept
? of how  fast or slow  things get done. Again, the concept of a pyramid, as an analogy to the biotic
f pyramid, is that you  move up when the base is sufficient. As good soil w ill not produce as much
I during a drought, so good talk may not move as quickly to agreement if relationships are strained
\ by circumstances.
After closing a deal, keep in touch and remain available in the community for people 
who will see what you have done and call on you to do it with them.
Feed Ideas to Policy Makers
State government and the state echelons of federal agencies probably will need to change 
programs, job descriptions, personnel, and even policy and law as local conservation evolves
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further. Local conservationists and landowners will have necessary suggestions for these 
changes. Therefore, local people and area managers should have a way to share ideas.
The Conservation Map
Conservation comprises both social phenomena (like negotiation) and ecological 
phenomena (like how land responds to projects meant to reduce waste and sustain chosen 
conditions). It follows, therefore, that both social and ecological information are helpful to 
conservationists. Because conservationists often use maps, those maps could be improved by 
including the social information described by the pyramid model of agreement.
Agreement pyramids can be mapped to show the state of agreements across a region. In 
Montana, moderate- to well-developed pyramids can be drawn over the Blackfoot Valley, the Big 
Hole Valley, and the Flathead Valley at least. Conservationists and landowners in my study often 
were able to describe not only how far along toward agreements they were in their place, but also 
how far along others were in other communities.
Mapping agreement pyramids to correspond with the amount or likelihood of agreement 
would a useful element to such mapping tools as Gap Analysis (Scott et al. 1991). The basic idea
i behind Gap Analysis is to compare land protection schemes with the location of chosen parts or
I conditions of land under threat. Where threatened land is unprotected, conservationists can
t.
|| focus their effort The codes on the map describing land protection are social codes, and they
P
6 usually describe jurisdictions of agencies or ownerships with conservation easements. By adding
J; agreement pyramids to maps, a Gap Analysis can show  where local conservation efforts are
| strong and where they need cultivation.
I
I
I The Last Word
I
j My study opens two doors to better understanding of conservation: (1) the relationships
f-
between conservationists and landowners; and, (2) the use of qualitative data.
Among the questions to be explored about relationships are: What measurable factors, if 
any, predict the likelihood of agreement? What are the prices and transaction costs in voluntary 
agreements? What is our current inventory of locally-based conservation?
Qualitative research methods enable us to begin answering these questions before we 
have techniques to measure relationships numerically. The scientific approach to these questions 
begins as we collect stories people tell about their experiences. Stories are key facts of evidence 
and can be handled as systematically as the study skins collected by early biologists.
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Perhaps gaining the ability to study relationships will change our thinking about what 
conservation means. Instead of thinking conservation is harmony between people and the 
resources, as Leopold (1949) described it, perhaps w e will see it also as harmony among people.
This not to say, of course, that Leopold's grasp of conservation was in any way dim. 
Indeed, no conservationist seems to have thought of anything that had not already occurred to 
Aldo Leopold. He once wrote, "there are two things that interest me: the relation of people to 
each other, and the relation of people to land" (Meine 1988:51).
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